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INTRODUCTION
Despite its congressional passage and pending ratification,
controversy still surrounds the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA),' both in the United States and Canada.2 Following years
of Bush administration support of free trade,' President Clinton faces
increased public concern over the agreement's impact on jobs and
the environment.' For many U.S. workers in mature industries such
as automobiles, steel, and textiles, the prospect of decreasing
employment outweighs any potential benefits that international free
trade agreements might produce.' Ironically, while commentators
1. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289-456, 605-799
[hereinafter NAFTA]. See generaly North American Free Trade Agreement, Texts of Agreement,
Implementing Bill, Statement of Administrative Action, and Required Supporting Statements,
H.R. Doc. No. 159, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
2. See Peter Rachleff, Solidarity vs. Competition at the Heart of Labor Issue, STAR TRIB., Nov. 15,
1993, at D3 (reporting history of labor opposition to NAFIA in United States, Canada, and
Mexico). Compare Kenneth W. Abbott, After NAFTA: The Uruguay Round, CHICAGO TRIB., Nov.
29, 1993, at N19 (discussing benefits of both NAFTA and GATT despite opposition of labor and
environmental groups), with Gene Green, There Were Good Reasons for Opposing NAFTA, HoUs.
CHRON., Nov. 24, 1993, at Cl (defending opposition to NAFTA based in part on labor
concerns).
3. See Brian O'Reilly, How to Keep Exports on a Roll FORTUNE, Oct. 19, 1992, at 68, 72
(contrasting Bush's support for free trade with Clinton's initial reluctance to support NAFTA);
see also Greg McDonald, Bush Travels to Texas to Mark Trade Agreement With 2 Leaders, HOUS.
CHRON., Oct. 8, 1992, at A8 (describing President Bush's support of free trade and NAFTA).
4. See KennethJ. Cooper, Democrats'House Whips Cut Both Ways on NAFTA; Party Leadership
Split Has White House Scrambling to Rally Support for Trade Pac, WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 1993, at A26
(surveying political divisions caused by NAFTA);James Gerstenzang, Clinton Maps an UphillBattle
for Trade Pact, LA. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1993, at A3 (discussing how Clinton administration put
together coalition of business executives and environmentalists that support NAFTA).
5. See Andrew LePage, Free-Trade Pact Targeted by Protesters: About 500 Workers; Labor and
Environmental Leaders Rally Against Agreement, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 23, 1992, at B4 (reporting
opposition of textile union workers to NAFrA); see also Peter Gorrie, Trade Pact Gets a Clean
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furiously debate NAFTA's impact on these preexisting jobs, few have
considered the agreement's impact on future high-technology jobs
and industries. By focusing on NAFTA's process patent provisions,
this Comment demonstrates the agreement's critical role in protecting
U.S. interests in high technology.
For owners of U.S. process patents,6 NAFTA offers a powerful
international approach for resolving the longstanding problem of
foreign process piracy.7 As this Comment will demonstrate, process-
based technologies represent technology critical to future U.S.
employment and economic security.8  NAFTA's provisions for
combating foreign piracy will help promote high-technology industries
and thus will promote future U.S. competitiveness worldwide.'
Foreign piracy of U.S. process patents has plagued U.S. patent
owners for well over a century.0 Reforms in domestic trade and
patent laws, though numerous, often have resulted in inadequate
protection for process patentees." The inadequacy of protective
measures stems from the unique nature of process patents, the
difficulty in proving their infringement, and the difficulties inherent
Report, TORONTO STAR, Nov. 3, 1992, at Al (reporting results of Canadian study that predicts
NAFTA will have positive impact on environment and labor); Don Turner, Trade Agreement Risks
U.S. jobs, CHI. TPRB., Oct. 26, 1992, at C12 (reporting economic studies of NAFTA's impact on
U.S. labor, including University of Massachusetts study predicting 290,000-490,000 lost jobs and
Economic Policy Institute study predicting 550,000 lost jobs).
6. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) ("Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful promess,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvements thereof,
may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.")
(emphasis added).
7. See infra notes 18-34 and accompanying text (discussing historical difficulties of
protecting U.S. process patents from foreign infringement).
8. See Critical Technology: OSTP Report, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Technology and
Competitiveness of the House Comm. on Science, Space, and Technology, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1991)
[hereinafter OSTP Report] (statement of Dr. William Phillips, Associate Director, Office of
Science and Technology Policy) (presenting report of National Critical Technologies Panel
outiining 22 technologies considered critical to future U.S. economic and national security).
The report noted striking similarities between its findings and those of a number of similar
reports prepared by other governmental agencies, including the Department of Commerce and
the Council on Competitiveness. Id. The report also notes "a great deal of overlap with critical
technology identifications that have been carried out by the Japanese and the European
Economic Community." Id.
9. See infra notes 136-56 and accompanying text (discussing need for NAFTA's strong
international standards in overcoming problems historically associated with foreign process
piracy).
10. See In re Amtorg Trading Corp., 75 F.2d 826, 831, 24 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 315, 321
(C.C.P.A.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 576 (1935). The court in Amtog stated:
No legislation of the nature of that proposed in 1852 has ever been enacted by the
Congress and the extent of patent rights granted by process patents, which extent
depends upon the statutes, has not been substantially changed by any law specifically
directed thereto since such was fixed by Act of April 10, 1790.
Id. at 832, 24 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 321-22.
11. See infra notes 49-72 and accompanying text (discussing domestic reforms and criticisms
of their effectiveness during past 60 years).
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in the international enforcement of U.S. patent rights' Unfortu-
nately, while the United States struggles with the process piracy
problem, countless process-based, high-technology industries are
damaged by or lost to foreign competitors.1 3
NAFTA's process patent provisions represent a significant advance-
ment for U.S. patentees against foreign piracy. By establishing
international standards and procedures for the enforcement of
intellectual property rights among member nations,14 NAFTA offers
to resolve the longstanding problems of jurisdiction, proof, and
enforcement associated with foreign process piracy.5 If the United
States intends to remain globally competitive in process-based, high-
technology industries, then it must continue to improve process
patent protection through international agreements such as
NAFTA. 6
Defining the importance of process patent protection requires a
multifaceted analysis. This Comment first characterizes the unique
nature of process patents. Second, the Comment explores the history
of process patent protection, illustrating the frustration that U.S.
patentees traditionally have experienced in enforcing their patent
rights. Third, the Comment considers the impact of increased world
trade and highlights the complex trade interests currently surround-
ing process-based technologies. Once the importance of process
patent protection is fully defined, the role that NAFTA plays in
furthering U.S. process protection becomes clear." Finally, this
Comment considers future challenges for process protection and
12. See S. REP. No. 83, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. 57 (1987) (discussing "difficulty a patentee
may have in proving that the patented process was used in the manufacture of the product in
question where the manufacturer is not subject to the service of process in the United States");
H.R REP. No. 60, 100th Cong., lst Sess. 16 (1987) (discussing problems that domestic patentees
have in bringing infringement actions against foreign manufacturers who are "not subject to
discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure"); see also infra notes 18-34 and
accompanying text (discussing how nature of process patents makes infringement actions against
foreign manufacturers difficult to prove).
13. See Unfair Foreign Trade Practices-Part 3: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigations and the Special Subcomm. on U.S.-Pacifwc Rim Trade of the House Comm. on Energy and
Commerre, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 12-15 (1986) [hereinafter Unfair Trade Hearings] (testimony of
Stephen F. Sims, Special Assistant, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations) (describing
how inadequate protection for process patents by some Pacific Rim nations has negative impact
on various U.S. industries, including pharmaceutical and biological industries).
14. See infra notes 136-56 and accompanying text (discussing NAFTA's improved process
patent protection).
15. See NAFrA, supra note 1, at ch. 17 (outlining procedural and remedial provisions to
enforce intellectual property rights).
16. See infra notes 35-48 and accompanying text (discussing role of process patents in critical
high-technology industries).
17. See infra notes 157-221 and accompanying text (presenting relevant NAFTA provisions
and considering impact of NAFTA on problems historically associated with process patent
protection).
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recommends federal involvement in promoting a competitive high-
technology industrial base.
I. DEFINING THE IMPORTANCE OF PROCESS PATENT PROTECTION
A. The Unique Nature of Process Patents
The process patent is unique both procedurally and substantive-
ly." The subject matter of process patents is inherently directed to
the "means of obtaining" a result, rather than the actual result. 9
Compared to proving infringement of a product, proving infringe-
ment of a process is more difficult because products are tangible and
typically in the stream of commerce, while processes are typically
conducted outside public view."0 Proving process infringement
therefore presents unique procedural difficulties based in part on the
hidden nature of process patent subject matter.2 The additional
burden of proving foreign infringement is a common procedural
weakness in process patent protection" arising from jurisdictional
deficiencies between sovereigns,21 including lack of discovery.
Substantively, process patents represent the inventor's right to
exclude others from using the process during the patent's term.
24
A "process" is defined as "an act or series of acts performed upon the
subject-matter to be transformed or reduced to a different state or
18. SeeDONALD S. CHIsuM, PATENTS § 1.03[1] (1992) (describing subject matter of process
patents as unusual in comparison with other utility patents and with respect to nature of
disclosed invention).
19. See Ethyl Corp. v. Hercules Powder Co., 232 F. Supp. 453, 457 (D. Del. 1963)
(describing difference between product and process patents as "[t]he former applies to a
discovered article, the latter applies to a new method of making an article").
20. See CHISUM, supra note 18, § 16.02[6]; see alsoWelsbach Light Co. v. Union Incandescent
Light Co., 101 F. 131, 131 (2d Cir. 1900) ('The broad proposition that the vendor of a product
which has been made in infringement of a patented process is an infringer, or liable to any
extent to the patentee, is untenable and does not require discussion. The patentee's remedy
is against the manufacturer."). The rationale set forth in Wesbach Light is no longer valid under
35 U.S.C. § 271(g); it serves, however, to illustrate the difference between infringement of a
patented product versus a patented process. See infra notes 91-117 and accompanying text
(tracing evolution of domestic patent law regarding treatment of foreign use of U.S. patented
processes).
21. See CHISUM, supra note 18, § 21.02[3] [b] (describing establishment ofjurisdiction over
foreign infringers and developments in minimum contacts analysis).
22. See H.R. REP. No. 60, supra note 12, at 16 (discussing need for presumption of foreign
infringement in patent enforcement proceedings).
23. SeeA.D. NEALE & M.L. STEPHENS, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND NATIoNALJURISDIaION
3 (1988) (discussing limits on exercise of sovereign authority, including treaties or conventions
that states enter into with other states). Neale and Stephens note that "[bleing sovereign means
that the decision-making of the legitimate organs of each state is autonomous, self determined,
not subject to any superior outside authority." Id.
24. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988) ("Every patent shall ... grant to the patentee ... the right to
exclude others from making, using, or selling the invention .... ."). The remainder of § 154
contains provisions designed to regulate foreign use of a U.S. process. See id.
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thing."' Like all patents, the inventor discloses the process to the
public in return for a term of exclusive use.26 Whereas a foreign
manufacturer can replicate any patented invention as a result of the
invention's disclosure,2 7 the patent owner can usually detect infringe-
ment of products through physical inspection. Conversely, the
foreign manufacturer's unauthorized use of a patented process may
remain undetected if the process does not produce a unique result. 2
Often, no satisfactory method exists for determining whether process
infringement has occurred.' Consider the following example.3"
Imagine you are the proud owner of U.S. Patent Number 6,000,000,
granted January 4, 1994. Directed to a process for producing high-
technology ceramic engine components, your patent represents years
of costly research and development." Assuming that the component
itself is not patentable, 2 the U.S. patent system requires you to
25. Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788 (1877). But cf. CHISUM, supra note 18, § 1.03[1]
(explaining courts' difficulties in defining "process" for purposes of determining patentable
subject matter). A precise definition of"process" is not required for purposes of this Comment.
Instead, it must be recognized that any definition of"process" focuses on determining the point
between a theory of operation and some degree of practice or application of that theory.
26. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988). The disclosure requirements for process patents are very
demanding. Section 112 provides:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise and exact terms
as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains... to make and use the
same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out
his invention.
35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988).
27. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988) (setting forth requirement that "one skilled in the art" be
able to use invention).
28. See H.R. REP. No. 60, supra note 12, at 16-17 (explaining inability to identify process
infringement in absence of unusual circumstances such as trace element analysis or ability to
prove that only one method of manufacture exists).
29. See H.R. REP. No. 60, supra note 12, at 16 (discussing rationale behind 1988 amend-
ments, which added presumption of infringement); infra notes 107-12 and accompanying text
(detailing § 9005(a) of Omnibus Trade Act of 1988 and process patent protection following its
enactment).
30. See Reginald Rhein, Jr., Patent Pirates May Soon Be Walking the Plank, BUs. WK., June 15,
1987, at 62 (reporting Kyocera Corporation's introduction of ceramic heat seals made under
process suspiciously similar to process patented in United States by Standard Oil Engineered
Materials, Inc.). This Comment uses the following hypothetical for two reasons. First, it aids
in understanding the inherent problem of disclosure. Second, it sets the stage for considering
the economic stakes for high-technology industry. Similarities between the hypothetical and the
reported dispute are purely coincidental.
31. See id. at 62 (reporting Standard Oil's loss at $8.6 million).
32. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) (providing four separate statutory classes of invention,
including product and process); see alsonAmgen, Inc. v. ITC, 902 F.2d 1532, 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(holding that product patent to genetically engineered cells used in producing proteins
provided no protection against foreign use of cell in process of producing protein). Unlike the
present hypothetical, Amgen had no process patent. Amgen serves to illustrate how one may
have a process and a product made from that process, and yet have only one patent, either for
the process or the product, or no patent at all. This decision illustrates much of the frustration
in biotechnology. Indeed, the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries pioneered much
608 THE AMERICAN UNIVERSrIY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:603
disclose how to process the component, yet does not grant you a
patent for the product itself.
Soon thereafter, a foreign components manufacturer obtains a copy
of your patent and begins producing parts using your disclosed
process. The foreign parts are exported to the United States and are
purchased by U.S. manufacturers, who are oblivious to the process
piracy. You cannot eliminate the sale of the parts because your patent
protects only the process for making the parts. Even more troubling
is your inability to prove the foreign manufacturer's process infringe-
ment because the products are essentially fungible.3 Although
procedures for such proof theoretically exist under present U.S.
patent law, careful analysis illustrates some residual problems. Under
existing U.S. law, for example, the importer of the parts would be
liable as an infringer while the true infringer-the foreign manufac-
turer-may continue to infringe the process.34
Moreover, process patents represent not just an invention, but a
significant national resource-high technology.35 Many technologies
considered vital to long-term U.S. economic security are process
based. 6 Thus, by disclosing critical process-based technologies, the
United States essentially tips its competitive hand when it subsequently
fails to commercialize the technologies competitively.37 Given the
inherent paradox of process disclosure, the implications of disclosure
for the many process-based U.S. industries are considerable.'
of the recent reform in U.S. patent law. See Elizabeth R. Hall, Comment, The Process Patent
Amendments Act of 1988. Closing a Loophole in United States Patent Law, 13 Hous.J. INT'L L. 343,
356-57 (1991) (discussing Amgen and its negative impact on pharmaceutical companies).
33. See supra notes 18-29 and accompanying text (discussing proof problems in foreign
process infringement).
34. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (1988). Section 271(g) provides in part:
Whoever without authority imports into the United States or sells or uses within the
United States a product which is made by a process patented in the United States shall
be liable as an infringer, if the importation, sale, or use of the product occurs during
the term of such process patent.
Id.; see also infra notes 110-11 and accompanying text (describing strengths and weaknesses of
process patent protection under § 271 (g)).
35. Cf OSTP Report, supra note 8, at 10-11 (statement of Rep. Rohrabcher) (discussing
importance of U.S. technology and need to preserve U.S. technological capability to ensure
national wealth and security).
36. See OSTP Report; supra note 8, at 26 (statement of Dr. William Phillips, Associate
Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy) (noting that categories of critical technology
need continual development of new products and processes).
37. See OSTP Report, supra note 8, at 29 (statement of Charles V. Shank, Director, Lawrence
Berkeley Laboratory) ("The ability of American industry to compete in the global marketplace,
and to provide high value added, high technology American jobs is inexorably linked to our
expertise and ability to provide leadership in these critical technological areas").
38. See Trade and Technology: Implications of the GA TT Negotiations, Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Technology and Competitiveness of the House Comm. on Science, Space, and Technology, 102d Cong.,
1st Sess. 53-54 (1991) [hereinafter Trade and Technology Hearings] (statement ofDavid C. Mowrey,
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Annually, the United States spends billions of dollars on research and
development of advanced technology that centers on processing and
synthesis.3 9 Without protection for such process-based technologies,
foreign piracy reduces U.S. industry's return on its investment, thus
eroding the U.S. high-technology base. 0
The United States can ill afford to lose its competitive technological
position.41 Yet foreign process piracy removes the incentive to
develop technologies by preventing adequate returns on high-
technology investments.' A U.S. manufacturer, fearing an inability
to recoup the significant development costs associated with a process-
based technology, may simply abandon the technology.43 Alterna-
tively, if a process-based technology is developed and disclosed
through a patent, a foreign manufacturer may then exploit the
technology without having to recoup development costs.' Further,
Associate Professor, Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley) (noting
increased need of U.S. businesses to form international alliances with foreign firms, thereby
increasing flow of high technology overseas). Although the United States has historically
maintained a strong competitive innovative posture, it remains unable to exploit technologies
competitively. Id. at 64. With so many critical process-based technologies, the United States has
a national economic interest in protecting its process-based intellectual property.
39. See Trade and Technology Hearings, supra note 38, at 68 (statement of Gerald J.
Mossinghoff, President, Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association) (stating that pharmaceutical
industry spent $9.2 billion on research and development (R&D) in 1991); see also Critical
Technologies: Materials, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Technologies and Competitiveness of the House
Comm. on Science, Space and Technology, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 164 (1991) [hereinafter Materials
Hearings] (statement of Rustum Roy, Professor, Pennsylvania State University) (reporting federal
R&D expenditure of approximately $150 million per year on high-temperature superconductors
and approximately $10 million on generic diamond film process technologies).
40. See Materials Hearings, supra note 39, at 136-37 (touting intellectual property protection,
and process patent protection in particular, as cornerstone of incentive to develop new technolo-
gies). With high technology development so costly, industries must have strong enforcement
mechanisms to recoup R&D investments. Id. at 136 ("The nature of research and development
in [advanced materials] is such that extensive processing, testing and characterization is
required. Scale-up beyond the laboratory stage depends on expensive capital equipment and
systematic processing trials.").
41. See Trade and Technology Hearings, supra note 38, at 56 (reporting that worldwide share
of technology-intensive exports from United States increased from 14% in 1966 to 22% in 1986).
42. See, e.g., Trade and Technology Hearings, supra note 38, at 91 (statement of Gerald J.
Mossinghoff, President, Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association) (noting that U.S. drug firms
lose up to 10% of potential world sales due to process piracy); Biotechnology Patent Protection,
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration ofJustice of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1990) (statement of David Beier, Vice
President, Government Affairs, Genentech, Inc.) (noting how inadequate protection for
biotechnology has negative effect on capital investments); id. at 137 (statement of Richard D.
odown, President, Industrial Biotechnology Association) (emphasizing need for process patent
protection in biotechnology industry).
43. See Materials Hearings, supra note 39, at 83-84 (statement of Mark S. Newkirk, President
and CEO, Lanxide Corporation) (stating that industries facing high development costs and long
transition periods between innovation and commercial production require investment of such
magnitude that only large corporations find such investment feasible).
44. See Trade and Technology Hearings, supra note 38, at 90-92 (statement of Gerald J.
Mossinghoff, President, Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association) (noting that increasing
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process-based technologies often spawn multiple commercial
markets.45 Hence, process patent protection is not only critical to
processing technologies that require significant development costs,
but is especially important to those technologies that embrace
multiple applications.4" Because high-technology industries are vital
to long-term economic prosperity,47 the United States can no longer
afford a hands-off approach to process protection.'
B. A Brief History of Process Patent Protection
The following history of process patent protection describes the
complex array of domestic laws, international trade agreements, and
other forms of international cooperation that affect the enforcement
of process patents today. It is important to view this evolution with an
eye to the unusual nature of process patents,49 which, together with
shifts in the global economic and political climate, have created
innovation costs in U.S. biotechnology industry endanger U.S. competitiveness). With the
development investment for a new drug costing approximately $230 million, and process patent
piracy diminishing the return on the investment, many drugs may go undeveloped. Id. at 91-92
("Someone with a basic knowledge of chemistry and pharmacology can copy most drugs at a tiny
fraction of an originator's huge cost. Without patents, there would be no research-based
pharmaceutical industry.").
45. See Trade and Technology Hearings, supra note 38, at 21 (statement of Rep. Ritter)
(explaining "that a major advantage or head-start in one technology often confers similar
advantages in others"); see also OSTP Report, supra note 8, at 14-15 (statement of Dr. William
Phillips, Associate Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy) (recognizing that
manufacturing, information, biotechnology, aeronautics, energy, and environment-related
industries rely on advanced materials); Materials Hearings, supra note 39, at 165 (statement of
Rustam Roy, Professor, Pennsylvania State University) (characterizing diamond film technology
as generic processing technology having dozens of applications).
46. See Trade and Technology Hearings, supra note 38, at 69 (statement of Gerald J.
Mossinghoff, President, Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association) (reporting International
Trade Commission finding that pharmaceutical industry loses $5 billion annually to process
pirates and recommending improved patent protection, especially for processes). With average
development costs of $230 million per drug and an average ten- to twelve-year lag before an
investment becomes a commercially marketable product, intellectual property protection is
paramount. Id. at91 (stating "the mostfundamental and widespread international problem [the
pharmaceutical] industry faces is the lack of adequate intellectual property protection in many
countries"). Advanced materials also have high development costs and long lead times. See
Materials Hearings, supra note 39, at 83-84 (statement of Mark S. Newkirk, President and CEO,
Lanxide Corporation) (reporting R&D costs for Lanxide Corporation of $150 million prior to
first commercial sale and transition times of 10-15 years between concept and commercial
product).
47. See LAURA D'ANDREA TYSON, WHO'S BASHING WHOM? TRADE CONFLICTS IN HIGH-
TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIES 12 (1992).
48. See Critical Technologies, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Technology and Competitiveness of the
House Comm. on Science, Space, and Technology, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1992) [hereinafter Critical
Technologies Hearings] (statement of Rep. Valentine) ("While we have reached consensus on
identifying these critical technologies, we have not reached agreement on what actions are
required to ensure that the American people benefit not only from the products, but from the
high-quality jobs that they create.").
49. See supra notes 18-48 and accompanying text (describing unique nature of process
patents and problems associated with their protection).
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tensions among the various modes of enforcement." This historical
review will highlight the deficiencies in present-day process protection,
thus providing a better reference point for analyzing NAFTA's process
patent provisions. 51
1. Domestic law to 1974
Historically, U.S. patent law provided no protection against foreign
use of a process patented in the United States. 2 Domestic patent
law simply did not consider such practice an infringement until the
late 1980s,5" and prior to 1945, U.S. courts had no jurisdiction over
foreign manufacturers.54 Consequently, U.S. process patentees relied
on U.S. trade laws for protection against "unfair acts" under the
administrative remedies provided under section 337 of the Trade Act
of 1930."5
Historically, under section 337, and through the U.S. Customs
50. See infra notes 52-90 and accompanying text (outlining evolution of domestic trade and
patent law and its relationship with international trade issues).
51. See infra notes 136-56 and accompanying text (describing problems in enforcing process
patent rights and NAFTA's contribution to their resolution).
52. See Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minnesota Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641, 642 (1915) ("The
right conferred by a patent under our law is confined to the United States and its Territories,
and infringement of this right cannot be predicated of acts wholly done in a foreign country.").
53. See infra notes 107-11 and accompanying text (discussing Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107). The new laws specifically
enabled victims of process patent infringement to seek remedies against infringers, including
damages and injunctive relief. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 271, 287 (1988).
54. See In re Amtorg Trading Corp., 75 F.2d 826, 831 (C.C.PA. 1935) (noting that owners
of U.S. patents are protected only against domestic infringers), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 576 (1935).
U.S. courts also lacked jurisdiction over domestic nonresident infringers. See Barton v. Nevada
Consol. Copper Co., 36 F.2d 85, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1929) (stating that although infringer had "regular
and established place of business" within district, court lacked venue because plaintiff did not
establish "use of process within district"); see also Kryiak v. Owens Bottle Co., 25 F.2d 358, 358
(N.D. 111. 1928) (holding "[slale of product of process patent in another district, of which
defendant is not resident, is not infringement which gives court its jurisdiction").
It was not until 1945 that courts started to take a different approach regarding local
jurisdiction. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 311-21 (1945) (permitting
states to exercise in personam jurisdiction over defendant outside forum state provided that
defendant had established minimum contacts with forum state). After 1945, a state could exert
personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant if the state's long-arm jurisdictional statutes
applied and due process considerations were met. See Honeywell, Inc. v. Metz Apparatewerke,
509 F.2d 1137, 1144 (7th Cir. 1975) (holding that personal jurisdiction exists under state long-
arm statute where foreign infringer maintains sufficient contacts with state in which district court
sits). Today, courts may not have jurisdiction over foreign defendants in certain circumstances.
SeeAsahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 116 (1987) (holding that where state
jurisdiction imposes burden on defendant in dispute involving two foreign corporations,
reasonableness of exercising personaljurisdiction must be assessed with respect to "fair play and
substantial justice").
55. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1988) (providing International Trade Commission and U.S. Customs
Service discretion to grant administrative remedy for unfair trade acts). The section 337 remedy
has endured a number of significant amendments. See infra notes 57-72 and accompanying text
(tracing evolution of section 337 actions).
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Service, a patentee obtained an exclusion order preventing the
importation of products, 6 based on an unfair trade practice" such
as infringement of a U.S. patent. Ironically, while section 337
historically recognized foreign infringement of U.S. product patents as
an unfair trade practice, its protection against foreign infringement
of U.S. process patents remained unsettled until 19408 when Con-
gress enacted section 337a.59 Following the enactment of section
337a, process patent owners could prevent the distribution of
imported products that were manufactured abroad using a process
56. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(e) (1982). Prior to its 1988 amendment, section 337 provided in
pertinent part: "The Commission shall notify the Secretary of the Treasury of its action under
this subsection directing such exclusion from entry, and upon receipt of such notice, the
Secretary shall, through the proper officers, refuse such entry...." Id.
57. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1982). Prior to its 1988 amendment, section 337 provided in part:
Unfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation of articles into the
United States, or in their sale by the owner, importer, consignee, or agent of either,
the effect or tendency of which is to destroy or substantially injure an industry,
efficiently and economically operated, in the United States, or to prevent the
establishment of such an industry, or to restrain or monopolize trade or commerce in
the United States, are declared unlawful, and when found by the Commission to exist
shall be dealt with, in addition to any other provisions of law, as provided in this
section ....
Id.
58. See In reAmtorg Trading Corp., 75 F.2d 826,834, 24 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 315, 323 (C.C.P.A.
1935) (refusing to find foreign use of U.S. patented process an "unfair act" under section 337
'unless the [district] court finds that it was the purpose of Congress in enacting section 337.
. . to broaden the field of substantive patent rights, and create rights in process patents
extending far beyond any point to which the courts have heretofore gone in construing patent
statutes"), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 576 (1935). In Amtorg, the court also clarified the process by
which jurisdiction could be exercised over the infringer, explaining that "suits brought for the
infringement of patents are required to be brought in either the judicial district of which the
defendant is an inhabitant, or in any district in which the defendant has committed an act of
infringement." Id. at 833, 24 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 322. In a blow to process patent holders,
Amtorg distinguished two previous cases, Frischer & Co. v. Bakelite Corp., 39 F.2d 247, 17
C.C.P.A. 494 (1930) and In re The Orion Co., 71 F.2d 458, 22 C.C.P.A. 149 (1934), which had
been interpreted as protecting processes under section 337, as only protecting product patents.
Amtorg, 75 F.2d at 831, 24 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 321. Thus, following Amtorg, the process patent
owner had no protection until 1940 when Congress enacted section 337a. See Act of July 2,
1940, ch. 515, 54 Stat. 724 (1940), repealed by The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107.
59. Act of July 2, 1940, ch. 515, 54 Stat. 724 (1940), repealed by The Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107.
Section 337a must not be confused with subsection 337(a). The former was enacted in 1940
to specifically protect processes in response to the Amtorg decision and provides:
The importation for use, sale, or exchange of a product made, produced, processed,
or mined under or by means of a process covered by the claims of any unexpired valid
United States letters patent, shall have the same status for the purposes of section 1337
of this title as the importation of any product or article covered by the claims of any
unexpired valid United States letters patent.
19 U.S.C. § 1337a (1982). But see supra note 57 (setting forth text of 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) as it
existed at time of Amtorgdecision). Although it has been amended, subsection 337(a) remains
in effect today. See infra note 109 and accompanying text (discussing 1988 amendments to
subsection 337(a)).
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patented in the United States.60 Until 1988, sections 337 and 337a
provided the only domestic protection against importation of products
manufactured abroad through the use of a process patented in the
United States.61
Unlike domestic patent law proceedings, which required personal
jurisdiction, exclusion of imports under sections 337 and 337a only
required in rem jurisdiction.62 Unfortunately, however, section 337
required the U.S. patentee to prove an unfair trade practice, namely
process infringement, before a section 337 action could even
proceed.63  In practice, the required burden of proof to trigger
section 337's exclusion order proved too formidable for many U.S.
process patentees. 64 In short, the hidden nature of foreign process
infringement prevented effective domestic enforcement of process
patent rights through section 337.
Despite the availability of section 337 and 337a remedies, they
remained largely unused until the late 1960s.65 As international
trade increased during the 1960s and 1970s, however, U.S. patent
owners increasingly relied on section 337 to prevent foreign infringe-
ment.66 Partly in response to the increasing usage of section 337,
the Trade Act of 1974 amended many of the procedures used for
enforcement.67 For example, adjudication through the International
Trade Commission was established to better manage patent-based dis-
60. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1982) (setting forth requirements for showing unfair trade
acts).
61. See infra notes 108-11 and accompanying text (discussing 1988 amendments to domestic
patent and trade law).
62. See Sealed Air Corp. v. ITC, 645 F.2d 976, 985-86, 209 U.S.P.Q. 469 (C.C.P. 1981)
(stating that ITC and Customs have always used in rem jurisdiction over articles and that in
personam jurisdiction is not required).
63. See Terry L. Clark, Comment, The FuturT of Patent-Based Investigations Under Section 337
After the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 1149, 1154 (1989)
(detailing numerous procedural hurdles required to trigger section 337, including proving
infringement, showing substantial injury to U.S. industry, showing that industry is efficiently and
economically operated, and identifying public welfare considerations). Between the enactment
of section 337a in 1940 and The Omnibus Act in 1988, the lack of personal jurisdiction
prevented the patentee from discovering whether process infringement took place. Thus, the
threshold burdens for initiating a section 337 action remained daunting.
64. See id. at 1162 (detailing problems associated with domestic injury requirement of
section 337 action).
65. See Harvey Kaye & Paul Plaia, Jr., The Filing and Defending of Section 337 Actions, 6 N.C.
J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 463, 465 (1981) (detailing development of patent rights protection
using section 337).
66. See Kaye & Plaia, supra note 65, at 465 (discussing increase in section 337 actions to
protect patented rights through exclusion orders).
67. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 341, 88 Stat. 1973, 2053-56 (1975) (codified
as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1988)). The Trade Act brought the International Trade
Commission (ITC) under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1988). Trade
Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 341, 88 Star. at 2054 (1975) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C.
§ 551 (1988)).
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putes. Although these new procedures provided some relief to
U.S. process patentees, criticism of the system as overly burdensome
continued throughout the 1970s and 1980s.69
The criticism of the domestic system, however, was actually a
manifestation of the frustration associated with the tremendous
increase in world trade during the previous decade. 7  By the mid-
1970s, international trade had evolved dramatically.71 Up to that
time, intellectual property had not historically been considered an
international trade issue. A review of the evolution of international
trade is therefore essential to understanding more recent develop-
ments in process patent protection. 72
2. The evolution of international trade under GATT
Increased globalization of trade following World War II created
complex trading relationships among nations.73 In an effort to
liberalize international trade, the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) was established in 1948.' 4  At its inception, GATT
68. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (1988) (granting to ITC investigatory and adjudication powers,
including power to determine patent issues such as validity); see also Wayne W. Herrington, U.S.
International Trade Commission: Imported Articles Made by Patented Processes, 14J. WORLD TRADE L.
549, 552 (1980) (discussing increased use of section 337 following 1974 restructuring of ITC
adjudications).
69. See Keith E. George, Note, Importation of Articles Produced by Patented Processes: Unfair
TradePractices orInfringement?, 18 GEO. WASH.J. INT'L L. & ECON. 129, 136-38 (1984) (discussing
series of ITC cases following 1974 Act in which patentees proved infringement, yet remained
unsuccessful based on deficient showings of other section 337 requirements such as injury to
domestic industry and public interest concerns); see also Clark, supra note 63, at 1162-67
(discussing similar problems with showing injury in section 337 actions).
70. See JOHN H. JACKSON & WILLIAM J. DAVEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC RELATIONS 9 (1986) (discussing significant increases in world trade between 1963 and
1973 as world export volume grew at annual rate of approximately 8.5%).
71. SeeRaymondJ. Ahearn, An Overview of the International TradingEnvironment, in MANAGING
TRADE RELATIONS IN THE 1980's, 18, 20 (SeymourJ. Rubin & Thomas R. Graham eds., 1983)
(discussing how remarkable expansion of world trade during 1950s and 1960s led to "economic
integration of the world economy enhanc[ing] prosperity in all major trading countries").
72. See Trade and Technology Hearings, supra note 38, at 11 (statement of Rep. Thornton)
(stating that "current GATT negotiations are expanding coverage beyond trade in products, and
I think it's important that we do expand the coverage of negotiations beyond trade in products
because services, intellectual property, and other elements of trade may have not been treated
as appropriately as they should"); see also Status of Intellectual Property Protection, Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on International Economic Policy and Trade of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1986) [hereinafter Status Hearings] (statement of Harvey E. Bale,Jr., Assistant
U.S. Trade Representative for Trade Policy and Analysis) (stating "from our side of the street,
so to speak, the Administration identified intellectual property protection as a key issue if not
the key issue for U.S. trade and competitiveness in the future").
73. See Abeam, supra note 71, at 18-20 (describing complexity created by tension of world
integration resulting from increased international trade and domestic concerns regarding
economic effects of such integration).
74. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187,
reprinted in 4 GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE: BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED
DOCUMENTS (1969).
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included only twenty-four nations, or "contracting parties." 5 Initially
designed to facilitate international trade through the removal of
tariffs among the contracting parties, GATT continues in this capacity
today.7" The early success in tariff reduction between the late 1940s
and the late 1960s, however, led to increasingly complex GATT
negotiations as more nations joined the agreement."
The contracting parties first discussed nontariff barriers during the
Kennedy Round of GATT negotiations in the 1960s."8 Unlike tariffs,
nontariff barriers are based on governmental infrastructures, such as
arbitrary customs valuations, inspection procedures, and packaging
requirements, that restrain trade in a variety of ways. 7' Although
their positions were largely undefined in the late 1960s and early
1970s, negotiators continued to refine their positions on these
nontariff barriers as GATT evolved from an international tariff
reduction mechanism to its modem role as a charter for international
trading practices.'n
75. See Thomas R Graham, GATs Wandering Ministerial in MANAGING TRADE RELATIONS
IN THE 1980's, supra note 71, at 7, 10. The term "contracting parties" refers to the contractual
nature of the GATT agreement. See R. Michael Gadbaw, The Outlook for GATT as an Institution,
in MANAGING TRADE RELATIONS IN THE 1980's, supra note 71, at 33, 37 ("'[T]he GATT is a
contract. It has no members, only contracting parties.'") (quoting former GATT Director
General Oliver Long). Because GATT is a contract, it is provisional in nature and operates by
consensus. See Graham, supra, at 10-11 (stating that consensus represents will of contracting
parties and indicates confidence in system).
76. See Ahearn, supra note 71, at 20 (stating that during its first decade of operation, GATT
established "[k]ey rules limiting government intervention in the international marketplace
centered on tariffs and quantitative restrictions"). The U.S. tariff rate has dropped significantly
during GATIT's operation. See Graham, supra note 75, at 10 (reporting drop in U.S. average
tariff rate between 1946 and 1987 from 26% to 5%); see also Trade and Technology Hearings, supra
note 38, at 23 (statement of Charles Owen Verrill, Jr., Partner, Wiley, Rein & Fielding) (stating
"in this [Uruguay] round of negotiations, like previous GATT negotiations, tariff reductions are
a key market access objective").
77. SeeAhearn, supra note 71, at 21. Although GATT was created as a temporary measure,
it became permanent when nations rejected the proposed International Trade Organization
(ITO). See Gadbaw, supra note 75, at 33-35 (explaining that parties to GATT rejected ITO's
strong institutional and legal framework because of concerns over relinquishing sovereign
control over commercial policy). Thus, without a centralized administrative organization, GATIr
became strained in its second decade of operation, a decade characterized by a remarkable
increase in world trade. Id. at 35.
78. See SemourJ. Rubin & Thomas R. Graham, Introduction, in MANAGING TRADE RELATIONS
IN THE 1980S 1, 1 (SeymourJ. Rubin & Thomas R. Graham eds., 1983) (discussing nontariff
trade distortions as "leading edge of trade policy discussions at the close of the Kennedy Round
in the late 1960s"). Essentially, GATr's ability to remove tariffs was not indicative of its ability
to manage societal organizations. Id. at 10; see alsoJACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 70, at 325-26
(stating that Kennedy Round failed to achieve progress on nontariff barriers, but that these were
addressed significantly during Tokyo Round's Multilateral Trade Negotiations).
79. See Graham, supra note 75, at 10 (identifying subsidies, product standards, and import
licensing as non-tariff trade barriers).
80. SeeJeffreyJ. Schott, More Free Trade Areas?, in FREE TRADE AREAS AND U.S. TRADE POLICY
1, 4 (JeffreyJ. Schott ed., 1989) (discussing challenges faced by GATT in adjusting to changes
in international commerce including liberalized trade in banking, insurance, and telecommuni-
cations services, and need for revisions in rules protecting high technology industry from unfair
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Nontariff barriers became the central focus of negotiations during
the Tokyo Round of GATT talks, which lasted from 1973 to 1979.81
During this round of negotiations, nontariff barriers became more
fully defined, illustrating the diversity of national procedures and
policies used by the contracting parties in the course of trade and
reflecting the parties' varied political, social, and economic structures
and priorities." Additionally, because GATT's membership had
grown substantially, the contracting parties' interest had grown
increasingly diverse 3 and disputes regarding nontariff barriers had
increased. 4 Ultimately, the contracting parties were unable to
resolve many of these national incompatibilities, and GAIT's
administrative and dispute resolution mechanisms were criticized as
inadequate, threatening the agreement's credibility and future
viability.
8 5
With a rapidly changing global economy and increasing internation-
al competition, the Tokyo Round marked a turning point for
GAT.86  By the time the Tokyo Round negotiations concluded,
trade practices such as dumping).
81. See Rubin & Graham, supra note 78, at 1.
82. See Rubin & Graham, supra note 78, at 2 (stating that "[d]isputes that bring into focus
questions about the acceptable level of government involvement in promoting industrial
development go far beyond the rudimentary GATT concept"). The contractual nature of GAT'',
combined with an inability to manage structural differences between sovereign members, led
to loss of faith in the system. Id. at 2. Rubin and Graham explain:
GATT is not a world government, but neither is it merely a debating forum .... [Ilt
is a 'contractual' system of rules that has worked reasonably well in the past because
the contracting parties have recognized that conducting their trade under a framework
of rules works to their mutual advantage. It follows, however, from the contractual
nature of GATT that the institution and the rules cannot deal seriously with subjects
before most influential contracting parties perceive the need to do so.
Id.
83. See Rubin & Graham, supra note 78, at 2-3 (noting that increased GATT membership
with divergence of interests frustrates consensus among contracting parties); see also Schott, supra
note 80, at 4 (stating that GATT is victim of its own success and attempts to extend discipline
into non-tariff practices have contributed to dissatisfaction with operation of GATT).
84. See JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 70, at 326 (outlining broadened scope of GATT"
following Tokyo Round, resulting in Multilateral Trade Negotiation designed to address
problems of nontariff barriers affecting international trade system over previous decade).
85. See Gadbaw, supra note 75, at 36. Gadbaw, describing the GATT crisis of the early
1980s, states:
[The crisis revolved around a] declining respect in national policies for the rules of the
international trading system and the underlying commitment to a multilateral
resolution of trade conflicts. This problem is compounded by the absence of a strong
international institution that can play a catalytic role in bringing countries together,
reminding them of the responsibilities and benefits of an open international trading
system and providing the analytic tools and innovative proposals to deal concretely with
the problems they confront.
Id.
86. See Graham, supra note 75, at 10 (expressing concern that Tokyo Round significantly
changed GATT's status as centerpiece of international trade). The lack of consensus among
contracting parties at the Tokyo Round eroded support for GATT. See Gadbaw, supra note 75,
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GATT's role in liberalizing international trade was in question,
s7
and the focus of international trade changed as GAIT members
sought the difficult balance between continued liberalization of
international trade and maintenance of national economic security.88
Thus, by the 1980s, national interests began to redefine the role of
GAT' Consistent with this trend, process patent protection has
advanced through a complex series of domestic and international
economic leveragings during the past thirteen years, as trading
nations jockeyed for globally competitive positions. 0
3. Process patent protection from 1980 to present: GA77 failures and
domestic responses
During the Reagan administration, government officials attempted
to reestablish support for GATT's underlying goal of liberalized
international trade.9" During GAIT's 1982 Geneva Conference, the
United States proposed to introduce high-technology trade issues into
the negotiations.92 Unfortunately, because the United States poorly
at 35 (stating that change in GAIT focus "altered the basic consensus over trade policy on which
GAT's early success depended").
87. See Rubin & Graham, supra note 78, at 2 (explaining that shift in focus of international
trade "threaten[s] to consign the GAT rules and institution to a reduced role in international
trade").
88. See Rubin & Graham, supra note 78, at I (discussing international community's new
focus on international competitive effects of "'industrial policies,' a fashionable phrase that
often means government-led nurturing of high-technology 'industries of the future,' ranging
from applied robotics to biotechnology to fiber optics"). The United States led the push for
discussions on high-technology trade during GATT's November 1982 Ministerial meeting. See
Graham, supra note 75, at 13 (describing U.S. concern over concerted industrial policies in
Japan and other countries).
89. See Ahearn, supra note 71, at 19 ("Trade problems of the 1980s have centered
increasingly on disputes between developed countries. The intensity of trade competition and
the growing role played by governments in determining market success are major causes of the
disputes."). Developed countries were caught between the need for free trade to ensure long-
term growth in markets, and the need to protect domestic industries as GATT struggled with
its inability to resolve disputes among its members. Determining the level of government
intervention that strikes the appropriate balance between the two was troublesome. See id.
(acknowledging that trade friction between major economies is systemic, elimination of
protectionism will continue as major area of dispute, and both bilateral and multilateral talks
should attempt to keep free trade system operating).
90. See Gadbaw, supra note 75, at 38-39 (describing "Balkanization" of international trade
policy whereby competitive position is leveraged through domestic policy and bilateral "mini-
GAiTs-).
91. SeeGraham, supranote 75, at 11 (reviewing 1981 Reagan administration "bicycle theory"
initiative that postulated that GATT "must move forward or it will fall over").
92. See Schott, supra note 80, at 4 n.4 (noting United States' ambitious agenda at 1982
summit for extending GAT to cover new technologies); see also Graham, supra note 75, at 11
(describing Geneva Summit as "representing the best and worst of the American approach to
such things-the best, because it was an earnest attempt to lead a faltering trading system and
reluctant trading partners forward into important new areas; the worst, because it was too
ambitious").
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defined its position, the proposal received little international
support.13 In light of international skepticism of GATT following the
Geneva Conference, the United States sought to protect its trading
interests through alternative international measures.94  These
measures included bilateral trade agreements and unilateral retaliato-
ry measures." In addition, the United States began strengthening
its international competitive position through domestic reforms,
including improvements in domestic patent law.96
Although discussions regarding domestic reforms in intellectual
property protection were well underway by the mid-1980s, 7 process
patent protection remained an international problem." In 1986,
following years of apathy and resistance toward GATT, the Uruguay
Round of GATT negotiations began. These negotiations included an
93. See Rubin & Graham, supra note 75, at 13 (describing high-technology trade proposal
as "a legitimate subject for future investigation" requiring additional definition to aid GATr in
'considering the competitive effects of sociopolitical systems"); see also Schott, supra note 80, at
4 (describing strong foreign resistance to new negotiations).
94. See Schott, supra note 80, at 4 (discussing parallel approaches to GATI" process).
95. Schott, supra note 80, at 4 (noting bilateral agreements with Israel and Canada and
retaliatory efforts under Trade Act of 1974 to open foreign markets to U.S. exports).
96. See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1342, 102
Stat. 1107, 1212-16 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1988)) (relaxing patentee's burden of proving
foreign infringement); H.R. 4814, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (proposing that importer of
products made abroad by U.S. patented process be considered patent infringer); S. 1841, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 501-503 (1983) (proposing changes in patent law which would classify
infringer as seller of product manufactured abroad using U.S. patented process); see also Trade
and Technology Hearings, supra note 38, at 57 (statement of David C. Mowrey, Associate Professor,
HAAS School of Business, University of California, Berkeley) (describing radical change in
Reagan administration's domestic technology policy between 1980 campaign pledge to remove
Federal Government from commercialization of new technologies and 1987 programs aimed at
strengthening government investment in high technologies such as ceramic superconductors,
semiconductor manufacturing, and other basic research areas); Graham, supra note 75, at 11
(describing U.S. trade agenda during Geneva Conference as raising "among political
constituencies unrealistic expectations that could not be met, leaving them disillusioned with
GAIT and determined to take corrective trade-restrictive actions in the 98th Congress").
97. See supra note 96 and accompanying text (discussing congressional bills seeking to
improve domestic patent law).
98. See Status Hearings, supra note 72, at 2 (statement of Rep. Bonker) ("[T]his is one area
in which the Administration and the leadership in both parties in the House agree. Intellectual
property rights ought to be clearly identified as a trade issue for purposes of this country's
bilateral relations with our trading partners."). The U.S. pharmaceutical industry, for example,
loses up to ten percent of its sales to piracy. Trade and Technology Hearings, supra note 38, at 91
(statement of GeraldJ. Mossinghoff, President, Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association); see
also Unfair Trade Hearings, supra note 13, at 24 (testimony of Stephen F. Sims, Special Assistant,
Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee) (noting study conducted by Pfizer Pharmaceuticals
which found that, in 1984, pirates sold about $42 million in Pfizer's patented products while
Pfizer sold $47 million). See generallyJames M. Gould, Protecting Owners of U.S. Process Patents from
the Importation of Pharmaceutical Made Abroad by Use of the Patented Process: Current Options, Proposed
Legislation, and a GA7T Solution, 42 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 346, 346-48 (1987) (discussing
exemplary problem of process patent protection relating to pharmaceutical industry).
99. See Schott, supra note 80, at 4 (noting strong foreign resistance to GATT negotiations
from Geneva conference of 1982 to Urugnay Round of 1986).
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ambitious U.S. agenda of trade-related intellectual property issues
(TRIPs). 1  Although the United States advocated improved intel-
lectual property protection during the Uruguay Round, multilateral
progress remained elusive."' Thus, with no GATT standards for
intellectual property as of 1986, a domestic section 337 action
remained the only remedy that U.S. process patent owners could use
against foreign process pirates.0 2 In Coming Glass Works v. United
States International Trade Commission, 103 however, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit dealt a lethal blow to both section 337
and process patent owners. Although the plaintiff overcame section
337's burden of proving foreign process patent infringement and
subsequent importation of the product into the United States, the
Federal Circuit upheld the International Trade Commission's (ITC)
determination that the plaintiff had failed to satisfy section 337's
"substantial injury" requirement because the quantity of infringing
imports was "de minimis."1°5 In light of the court's burdensome
requirement for process patent owners in Coming, the slow progress
of TRIPs in the Uruguay Round, and the losses U.S. industry was
100. See Mastering the World Economy, Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 100th Cong.,
1st Sess. 12 (1987) [hereinafter World Economy Hearings] (statement of James D. Robinson I,
Chairman & CEO, American Express, Chairman, Business Roundtable Task Force on
International Trade and Investment) (stating that while GATr must adapt, United States must
defend its own interests "if others won't play by the rules"). Mr. Robinson stated that "key
objectives" for the United States should include rules for trade in areas not covered by GATT,
such as agriculture, services, intellectual property, and investment. Id. at 13. In 1986, aJapan
Economic Institute Report stated that while GATT's 90 member countries accounted for 80%
of world trade, only 20% of that trade fell within GATT rules. See id. at 78 n.32 (reporting need
for improved GATT due to treaty's inability to resolve trade disputes).
101. See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 1990 TRADE POuCY AGENDA AND 1989
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM
24 (1990) (discussing temporary setbacks encountered at conclusion of 1988 Uruguay Round
talks). In December 1988, the Uruguay Round Trade Negotiations Committee held a meeting
to discuss all negotiating areas and to complete frameworks for continued negotiation. The
discussion to decide which types of intellectual property would be included in future talks
deadlocked after two years of negotiations. Id. The deadlock centered on whether the
negotiation would establish adequate and effective standards for protecting intellectual property
rights. Id. In April 1989, negotiators broke this deadlock on intellectual property. Id.
102. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1988) (providing remedies for unfair trade practices).
103. 799 F.2d 1559, 230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 822 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
104. Coming Glass Works v. ITC, 799 F.2d 1559, 1563, 230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 822, 823 (Fed.
Cir. 1986).
105. See id. (upholding administrative law judge's decision that quantity of imports was
minimal and importation ofJapanese product could not destroy market because Coming could
not meet U.S. market's demand for product). Apparently the administrative law judge chose
to discount certain phrases in section 337. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1988) (providing in part
that "effect or tendency of which is to destroy or substantially injure an industry, efficiently and
economically operated, in the United States, or to prevent the establishment of such an industiy)
(emphasis added). Thus, the court ignored two important points: first, the infringing imports
could increase in number to a point where their impact was injurious; and second, Coming
could increase its production to meet domestic demand. In light of this decision, even when
all requirements are met under section 337, a process patentee still might not prevail.
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sustaining through international piracy,"°6 it became clear that a
change in domestic process patent protection was necessary.
0 7
The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (the Trade
Act)"0 8 constituted a milestone for U.S. process patent owners. The
Trade Act amended the burdensome proof requirements of section
337,109 and through § 27 1(g) made the importation or sale of
goods manufactured abroad using a U.S. patented process an
"infringement" actionable under U.S. patent laws."' The Act also
established a presumption of foreign process infringement for use in
actions under both section 337 and § 27 1(g).1" Thus, following the
106. See supra note 98 (discussing problem of process patent protection in U.S. pharmaceuti-
cal industry).
107. See H.RL CONF. REP. NO. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 1085-90 (1988).
108. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C. and 35 U.S.C.).
109. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1988). The amended section provides in part:
(a) Unlawful activities; covered industries; definitions
(1) Subject to paragraph (2), the following are unlawful, and when found by the
Commission to exist shall be dealt with, in addition to any other provision of law,
as provided in this section...
(B) The importation into the United States, the sale for importation, or the sale
within the United States after importation by the owner, importer, or consignee,
of articles that...
(ii) are made, produced, processed or mined under, or by means of, a process
covered by the claims of a valid and enforceable United States patent.
19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1988).
110. Process Patent Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 9003, 102 Stat. 1563,
1563-64 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (1988)). Section 271(g) provides:
Whoever without authority imports into the United States or sells or uses within the
United States a product which is made by a process patented in the United States shall
be liable as an infringer, if the importation, sale, or use of the product occurs during
the term of such process patent. In an action for infringement of a process patent, no
remedy may be granted for infringement on account of the noncommercial use or
retail sale of a product unless there is no adequate remedy under this title for
infringement on account of the importation or other use or sale of that product. A
product which is made by a patented process will, for purposes of this title, not be
considered to be so made after-(1) it is materially changed by subsequent processes;
or (2) it becomes a trivial and nonessential component of another product.
Id.
111. 35 U.S.C. § 295 (1988). Section 295 provides:
In actions alleging infringement of a process patent based on the importation, sale or
use of a product which is made from a process patented in the United States, if the
court finds-() that a substantial likelihood exists that the product was made by the
patented process, and (2) that the plaintiff has made reasonable effort to determine
the process actually used in the production of the product and was unable so to
determine, the product shall be presumed to have been so made, and the burden of
establishing that the product was not made by the process shall be on the party
asserting that it was not so made.
Id.
The presumption of infringement also applies to section 337 actions, but again, procedural
problems arise. Under § 271(g), the importer, and not the actual process infringer, may be
deemed the "infringer." 19 U.S.C. § 271(g).
Thus, if a relationship exists whereby the legal infringer has access to the actual process, then
the plaintiff must comply with the request for disclosure and reasonable-efforts requirements.
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Trade Act, owners of U.S. process patents had both patent and trade
law remedies against foreign process pirates.
In 1989, however, a GATT panel determined that the amended
section 337 procedures violated GATV12  This determination
highlights the tension between domestic laws such as section 337 and
the free-trade spirit of GATT. As discussed previously, section 337
seeks to prevent unfair trade practices, such as importation of patent
infringing products.1 3 From a GATT perspective, however, section
337 was discriminatorily applied and thus constituted a barrier to free
trade.' Recognizing the effectiveness of section 337 proceedings,
Congress is considering legislation to conform section 337 with GATT
See W. Bradley Haymond, The Process Patent Amendments Act of 1988. Solving an Old Problem, But
Creating New Ones, 1989 B.Y.U. L. REv. 567, 572-573 (1989) (detailing notice and request for
disclosure requirements under Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988). Even if the
plaintiff complies with the good faith request for disclosure and notice requirements, which
potentially further expose patentees, the infringer may still deny infringement of the process.
See H.R. REP. No. 60, supra note 12, at 16-17. In discussing the ultimate burden of proof in the
"reasonable efforts" requirement of § 9005 of the Omnibus Trade Act (codified at 35 U.S.C. §
295), the House Report states:
When a defendant meets the burden of producing evidence to rebut the plaintiff's
showing of substantial likelihood of infringement, the burden of persuading the court
will be on the patent owner. As in all civil litigation, the plaintiff bears the burden of
establishing the truth of the complaint by a preponderance of the evidence in order
to prevail.
Id.
The nature of the process prevents adequate discovery in a willful infringement of process
patents.
Conversely, if no relationship exists between the legal infringer and the actual or true
infringer, the court may lack personal jurisdiction over the foreign manufacturer. See Asahi
Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 105 (1987) (finding that lower court's
assertion of personal jurisdiction over foreign manufacturer violated traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice despite fact that foreign manufacturer released goods into stream
of commerce); supra notes 32-46 and accompanying text (discussing procedural problems
associated with foreign process infringement). But see Lemelson v. Van Dorm Plastics Mach., 25
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2054, 2054 (Nev. 1992) (finding personal jurisdiction over NisseiJapan based
upon Nissei's wholly owned subsidiary having direct contacts in forum state over whom Nissei
ofJapan "exercises sufficient control and management" and that a close relationship between
parent and subsidiary may "justify a finding that parent did business in a jurisdiction through
the acts of its subsidiary.").
112. See United States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, Report by the Panel Adopted on 7
November 1989 (L/6439), GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE: BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND
SELECTED DOCUMENTS 345, 396 (36th Supp. 1990) [hereinafter GATTPanel Report] (finding that
treatment accorded foreign products under section 337 is inconsistent with national treatment
obligations under GATT article I); see generally Robert G. Krupka et al., Section 337 and the
GATT: The Problem or the Solution?, 42 Am. U. L. REv. 779 (1993) (discussing nature of section
337 practice and proposing means for aligning section 337 with GATT).
113. Seesupranotes55-60 and accompanying text (discussing protection section 337 provides
to patent owners).
114. See GATFPanel Report supra note 112, at 396 (concluding that inconsistent treatment
of foreign and domestic products under section 337 violates national treatment requirements
of GATI' article I, 4, and that section 337 proceedings do not fall within dispute resolution
exceptions of GATT article XX(d)).
THE AMERICAN UNmERSrIY LAW REVIEW
requirements.115
Section 27 1(g) may also receive close GATT scrutiny in light of a
recent decision by the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania in Allegheny Ludlum Corp. v. Nippon Steel Corp."6 By
misinterpreting the language of § 271 (g)'s grandfather clause, the
court has applied § 271 (g) in a manner that appears to discriminate
against foreign manufacturers. 17 Given the district court's interpre-
tation, this statute may also be open to international criticism for
violating the GATT's national treatment spirit." 8
C. State of the Art
The 1988 Trade Act represents tremendous progress for U.S.
process patent owners." 9 By strengthening domestic trade and
patent laws, the Act protects an inventor's incentive to innovate and
recognizes processing technologies' importance to the U.S. econo-
my.2° But in the face of widespread international process patent
piracy, 121 domestic measures such as section 337 and section 271(g)
remain inadequate in a number of respects.
First, neither section 337 nor § 271 (g) prevents actual process
infringement. Section 337, for example, only blocks the importation
of infringing goods. 2 2 Furthermore, and despite the Omnibus Act's
presumptive burden shifts, 23 1triggering section 337 may still require
115. See 138 CONG. REC. S12,356 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1992) (statement of Sen. Rockefeller)
(presenting bill to amend section 337 to conform with GATT articles III and XX(d) in order
to provide effective procedures to contend with unfair trade practices). The administration also
backed plans to reform section 337. See, e.g., U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PTO PROPOSAL
(Jan. 1991) (proposing numerous procedural amendments to section 337 actions).
116. 765 F. Supp. 224, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1553 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
117. See Robert R. Deveza, Comment, A Grandfather Clause, Due Process and the GATT:
Whatever Happened to the Grandfather Clause of the Process Patent Act of 1988?, 18 RUTGERS
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 65, 82-94 (1992) (discussing Allegheny Ludlum Corp. v. Nippon Steel
Corp., 765 F. Supp. 224, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1553 (E.D. Pa. 1991) and arguing that court's
interpretation of§ 271 (g) provides discriminatory treatment and is therefore potentially violative
of GATT).
118. Id.
119. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (discussing Amtorg which gave no rights to
process patent owners through patent or trade law). Fifty years later, with the enactment of the
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act in 1988, the process patent owner has two alternatives:
trade law and patent law.
120. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text (defining nature of process patents and
their role in critical U.S. technologies).
121. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (noting that pharmaceutical industry has lost
millions of dollars to international piracy).
122. See supra notes 52-68 and accompanying text (describing remedies available under
section 337).
123. See supra note 111 and accompanying text (discussing 35 U.S.C. § 295, which places
burden of establishing absence of patent infringement on alleged infringer).
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proof of the hidden process infringement.1 24  Finally, section 337's
status remains questionable following the determination that it
violates GATr'.
Alternatively, a patent infringement action under § 271 (g) remains
attractive because it stops the importation and sale of infringing
goods. Once again, however, proving the process infringement
remains an obstacle despite presumptive shifts in burdens of
proof.126 Additionally, patent owners that cannot establish personal
jurisdiction over foreign entities will have difficulty conducting
discovery and eliminating the actual process infringement.
27
Second, the theft of U.S. process technology jeopardizes more than
just the individual patentee's incentive to innovate: it also puts at risk
the international competitiveness of U.S. high-technology indus-
try.128 Under both section 337 and § 271 (g), the foreign infringer
remains free to continue using the process and gaining all of its
associated competitive advantages internationally. 29  Thus, while
improved domestic process patent protection helps to protect
individual process patent rights, the failure to stop the actual
infringement permits continued piracy and the consequent erosion
of the U.S. high-technology base. 3 ' Elimination of the actual
foreign process infringement requires an international solution, not
just domestic action. 3' U.S. process patent owners, therefore,
should consider NAFTA's international scope an important step in the
protection of their process-based inventions.
Despite its disturbingly slow pace toward agreement, GATT still
124. See supra note 111 (discussing H.R. REP. No. 60, which places ultimate burden of proof,
after defendant rebuts plaintiff's showing of "substantial likelihood of infringement," on patent
owner).
125. See supra note 117 and accompanying text (discussing GATT panel's conclusion that
section 337 violates GATT obligations); see also supra note 115 and accompanying text (discussing
proposed reform of section 337 to comply with GATT).
126. See supra note 11 (discussing inability to reach true infringer through section 337 or
§ 271 (g), although presumption of infringement exists).
127. See supra note 111 (discussing Asahiand difficulty in asserting personaljurisdiction over
foreign manufacturers).
128. See Trade and Technology Hearings, supra note 38, at 69 (statement of Gerald J.
Mossinghoff, President of Pharmaceuticals Manufacturers Association) (suggesting need for
increased protection in area of intellectual property due to huge economic losses resulting from
patent piracy).
129. See supra notes 38-48 and accompanying text (discussing adverse effects on investment,
technology base, employment, and security associated with foreign infringement in U.S. high-
tech industries).
130. See Materials Hearings, supra note 39, at 84 (statement of Marc S. Newkirk, President and
CEO, Lanxide Corporation) (calling for governmental support in key technologies in order to
bolster domestic competition against foreign manufacturers); see also supra note 37 (noting need
to prevent further erosion of U.S. technology base).
131. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (discussing congressional comments on
international scope of process piracy).
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offers hope for process patent holders because of its broad interna-
tional scope.132  With the Uruguay Round complete, 133 it appears
that broader support for intellectual property as a trade issue is
forthcoming."' But considering the nature and substance of
process patents and their relation to a competitive trade posture, U.S.
high-technology industry requires a faster response time than GATT
currently provides for addressing its own structural shortcomings.
13 5
NATA may present U.S. industry with the responsive mechanism that
it so clearly needs.
II. NAFTA
A. An Overview
NAFTA represents an important step in protecting the competitive
position of U.S. high-technology industries by establishing internation-
al standards for the protection of intellectual property generally, and
process patents specifically."6 While some problems historically
132. See Trade and Technology Hearings, supra note 38, at 132 (testimony of David C. Mowery,
Associate Professor, HAAS School of Business, University of California, Berkeley) (recognizing
GATT as slow-moving organization that is unable to act decisively on major issues).
133. See President Clinton's Submission to Congress of Documents Concerning Uruguay Round
Agreement December 15, 1993, Daily Report for Executives (BNA), Dec. 17, 1993 (reporting that
"principal negotiating objectives" of Uruguay Round were achieved, including implementation
of adequate intellectual property standards and effective dispute settlement procedures); Draft
Final Text of the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Trade of the Comm. on Ways and Means, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1992) [hereinafter
Uruguay Round Hearing] (statement of Rep. McGrath) (discussing U.S. industry's response to
GATT Director Arthur Dunkel's proposed draft of December 20, 1991).
134. See Uruguay Round Hearing, supra note 133, at 88 (statement of Peter C. Richardson,
Senior General Counsel and General Patent Counsel, Pfizer, Inc.) (stating that Dunkel Draft
goes "a long way" in providing international intellectual property protection). Trade talks on
intellectual property would be especially promising if GATT eventually manages to provide
administrative and dispute resolution mechanisms that foster trust and support from the
contracting parties. One commentator states:
As one looks at the context of these talks and the issues they will address, there is
considerable room for doubt whether they can succeed without some serious
reevaluation of the function of GATT in the international trading system and a
concerted effort to improve the institutional mechanisms in GATT for decision-making,
rule development, enforcement, and policy coordination.
Gadbaw, supra note 75, at 37.
135. See Trade and Technology Hearings, supra note 38, at 132 (statement of David C. Mowery,
Associate Professor, HAAS School of Business, University of California, Berkeley) (cautioning
against overemphasis on GATT as means for improved protection for intellectual property due
to difficulty of defining standards needed for proper enforcement of newer, fast-developing
technologies).
136. See GARY HUFBAUER &JEFFREYJ. SCHoTr, NAFTA: AN ASSESSMENT 90 (1993) (noting
that "[i]n the intellectual property area, NAFTA stands as a model both for resolving
outstanding disputes and for locking in reforms previously enacted").
624
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associated with process patent protection will likely remain,
37
NAFTA signals a stronger U.S. commitment to protect domestic
economic and security interests." Similar to GATT, NAFTA's
contracting parties will establish the rules by which they agree to
trade."3 9 Unlike GATr, however, NAFTA's contracting parties will
have agreed at the treaty's inception on provisions relating to
intellectual property protection, process patents, and other high-
technology trade issues. 4°  Like GATT, the basic structure of the
agreement liberalizes trade among member nations."4 NAFTA,
however, includes only three contracting parties;4 this important
feature of the agreement should help facilitate consensus on a
broader range of issues.
In recognition of the problems associated with foreign process
piracy, NAFTA also contains provisions specifically for process
patents.' Now that it has been ratified, NAFTA may succeed in
advancing the international enforcement of process patent rights.
1 45
NAFrA's success in enforcing international intellectual property
137. See infra notes 187-89 and accompanying text (outlining areas of potential problems in
NAFrA's prevention of foreign process piracy even after ratification).
138. See HUFBAUER & SCHOTr, supra note 136, at 90 (noting NAFTA's accomplishments that
have helped it become preferred standard for measuring accomplishments of GATr and other
trade agreements); see also Trade and Technology Hearings, supra note 38, at 126 (statement of
Gerald J. Mossinghoff, President, Pharmaceutical Manufacturer's Association) (discussing
NAFrA's positive impact on intellectual property standards among Canada, Mexico, and United
States).
139. See NAFrA, supra note 1, at art. 101 (providing "The parties to this Agreement,
consistent with Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, hereby establish
a free trade area").
140. See ABA Meeting Looks at NAFTA and Intellectual Property Rights, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
No. 17, at 724-25 (Apr. 22, 1992) (reportingsimilarity ofNAFTAintellectual property provisions
to proposed trade-related intellectual property text by GATT Director General Arthur Dunkel).
141. See NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 102 (outlining objectives including facilitating cross-
border movement of goods and services, promoting conditions offair competition, and creating
effective procedures for resolution of disputes among others).
142. See NAFTA, supra note 1, at annex 201.1 (listing Canada, Mexico, and United States as
countries that are parties to NAFTA).
143. See Graham, supra note 75, at 10 (discussing GATT's early success with only "twenty-four
mostly like-minded governments" that originally chartered agreement). GATT currently has 116
contracting parties, which creates difficulty in reaching complete consensus on issues such as
intellectual property. See Schott, supra note 80, at 7-8 (discussing problems of reaching
consensus in GATT and resultant shift to smaller free trade agreements that "are regarded as
more effective and expeditious means to achieve trade liberalization among 'like-minded'
trading partners").
144. See infra notes 172-97 and accompanying text (reviewing NAFrA provisions on process
patent protection).
145. See HuFBAuER & SCHOTr, supra note 136, at 90 (noting that under NAFTA, "products
and process inventions will be patentable in almost all fields of technology"). Hufbauer and
Schott further emphasize that 'the accomplishments of NAFTA are so striking that it has quickly
become the preferred benchmark for evaluating the accomplishments of GATT and other trade
agreements." Id.
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standards ultimately will depend on its ability to resolve disputes.1 46
As GATT aptly demonstrates, an inefficient dispute resolution system
can destroy the parties' confidence in their agreement. 147
NAFTA's dispute resolution system, which resembles the procedures
used successfully in the Canada-United States Free Trade Agree-
ment,148 appears better equipped than GATT's system to foster
satisfactory dispute resolution. 49  Further, with fewer parties,
NAFTA is well positioned to maintain fair and efficient international
proceedings, and is thus less likely to suffer GATT-like erosion of the
agreement's cooperative spirit.5 ° The efficient enforcement of the
intellectual property rights of contracting parties may, in turn, lead to
improved discovery procedures for patentees who suspect foreign
process infringement."
146. See Gadbaw, supra note 75, at 46 (recognizing coordination, decisionmaking, and dispute
settlement as keys to effectiveness of multilateral trade institution); see also HUFBAUER & SCHOTr,
supra note 136, at 90 (noting that "[t]he value of NAFTA provisions on intellectual property
rights will clearly depend on the effectiveness of enforcement").
147. See Schott, supra note 80, at 4 (noting skepticism of GATr's efficacy following 1982
Ministerial and increasing need for alternative approaches to protect U.S. trading interests).
The 1982 Ministerial was a meeting of GATT trade ministers called by the United States. Id. at
4 n.4. The purpose of this event was to prepare for a new round of trade negotiations. Id. The
failure of this meeting provoked further skepticism of the GATI process. Id.
148. See HUFBAUER & SCHOrr, supra note 136, at 102 (noting NAFTA's dispute resolution
mechanism similar to Canada-U.S. FTA). The similarities include selecting panelists to judge
disputes and establishment of a "trilateral Trade Commission" in order to resolve disputes and
administer the agreement); see also MEXICO, INVESTMENT AND TRADE: PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS
80, 384-85 (Practicing Law Institute 1993).
149. See Schott, supra note 80, at 320 (comparing dispute settlement mechanism of Canada-
United States Free Trade Agreement with that of GATT and noting that "[t]he bilateral
mechanism is arguably superior to the GATT mechanism in a number of ways, not the least of
which are the right to initiate a panel, and procedural deadlines establishing an orderly
timetable"); cf Gadbaw, supra note 75, at 42-43 (comparing pragmatist and legalist views of
multilateral dispute settlement). Essentially, the United States favors the legalist view of dispute
settlement. Gadbaw, supra note 75, at 43. This view emphasizes that GATT is "a set of legal
rules intended to provide fairly precise limits on natural actions." Id. at 42. The legalist view
is contrasted with the pragmatist view, which deemphasizes the structure of GATT rules and
interprets the rules to be "guidelines that can be read only in the light of the underlying
consensus." Id.
The United States prefers a consistent approach to intellectual property. For example, the
parties cannot take the pragmatist approach, agree on rules, and then renegotiate the contract
if consensus is lost. Considering the strong rules proposed in NAFITA's intellectual property
provisions, it appears that NAFTA avoids, the pragmatist approach. See id. at 43. Notably,
however, when one actually looks to the practice of dispute settlement in the respective
countries, particularly in the United States, the characterizations become blurred. The United
States, in handling disputes, often conducts a more pragmatic approach. Id. Conversely, the
EEC has recently shown signs of a more legalist approach. Id.
150. See Schott, supra note 80, at 8-9 (explaining that trade agreements with fewer countries
yield certain benefits, such as streamlined dispute settlement procedures).
151. See NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 1803 (providing mechanism for contracting parties to
request and receive information from another party). In cases of suspected process
infringement, the United States could request information which might aid in determining the
process used by the foreign manufacturer. See id. at art. 2014-15 (providing retention of experts
and scientific review boards to address "any factual issue concerning environmental, health,
626
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Finally, the contracting parties might use these NAFMA innovations
to affect future GATT negotiations. 5 2  It is difficult to determine
what impact, if any, NAFrA's October 1993 passage had on the
conclusion of the Uruguay Round in December. While GATT
negotiators adopted the Dunkel Text with only minor changes,153
this may have occurred despite NAFTA's passage. NAFTA, however,
certainly demonstrates the United States' determination in furthering
its trade interests in areas not traditionally addressed by the GATT.
Although using bilateral agreements to negotiate leverage in
multilateral talks involves risks, 54 the United States certainly recog-
nizes the bargaining power of the three-member nucleus. 155 Thus,
if NAFTA is successful in its broadening of intellectual property rights
safety or other scientific matters raised by a disputing party"); see also infra note 219 and
accompanying text (discussing Article 1719 regarding cooperation and technical assistance).
152. See World Economy Hearings, supra note 100, at 5 (testimony ofJames D. Robinson IIL
Chairman & CEO, American Express, Chairman, Business Roundtable Task Force on
International Trade and Investment). Mr. Robinson stated:
A comprehensive agreement with the Canadians would create a powerful market-
oriented free trade zone. We have to face the possibility that the European
Community may one day tighten its ranks against the rest of the world and that the
GATT negotiations may not succeed. And in such a world, the Canadian Market would
be even more important to the United States.
If we are successful in Canada, we can use those talks as a model for multilateral
agreements in GATT. And if we fail in Canada, which is our largest trading partner
and neighbor, how can we hope to be successful at the GATT table?
Id.
Although the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement was not in effect at the time of this
testimony, the Canadian agreement recognizes the leverage needed to forge consensus in GATT
negotiations, and how NAFTA, with Canada and Mexico, represents a powerful trading group
capable of dealing with Japan and the consolidating European Community. Japan remains
somewhat perplexed by the concept of a "borderless Europe," and is concerned with the
emerging system of regional trading blocs. See Charles Leadbeater, Life in the Single Market:
Europe's Compulsion to Unify Mystifies the Japanese, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1993, § 1, at 6 (noting
Japanese concern over possibility of facing "Western alliance" in event that EC and United States
form closer trade relationship). The Financial Times quotes Toshio Tanaka of Tokyo's Kieo
University as stating: "Two against one-that is what we fear." Id.
153. See supra note 133 (discussing adoption of Dunkel text in Uruguay Round of GATT
negotiations).
154. See Gadbaw, supra note 75, at 38-39 (discussing erosion of GATT system through
fragmentation of agreements). NAFTA can be characterized as a "mini-GATT," working in
conjunction with GATT, yet undermining enthusiasm for achieving broad multilateral consensus
through GATT. Id. at 39; see also Schott, supra note 80, at 53 (arguing that bilateral agreements
are often approached as substitutes for, rather than compliments to, multilateral talks). Whereas
the United States appears to be using bilateral agreements to "close the leaks" in multilateral
talks such as GATT, there is concern that a continued lack of progress in GAIT could lead the
United States to substitute bilateral arrangements for GATT. See id. at 2-3 (discussing dilemma
of U.S. trade policy regarding tactical trade-offs between bilateral and multilateral negotiations).
155. See HUFBAUER & SCHOTr, supra note 136, at 116 (recognizing NAFIA as improvement
in international competitive posture for members, which increases their negotiating leverage in
GAIT, rather than as shift in U.S. trade policy toward regionalism). But see Emily Thornton,
Will Japan Rule a New Trade Bloc?, FORTUNE, Oct. 5, 1992, at 131, 132 (predicting thatJapan-led
Pacific Rim trading bloc would be unlikely unless "the U.S. and Europe turned markedly more
protectionist against both the Japanese and the rest of Asia").
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and resolution of disputes, it will undoubtedly influence the structure
and results of future GATT negotiations beyond the Uruguay
Round.1
56
B. NAFTA Provisions Relating to Intellectual Property
1. Preliminary provisions
Chapter 17 comprises NAFTA's twenty-one articles addressing
intellectual property issues.'57  The first articles establish ground
rules that apply to all provisions under chapter 17.158 The ambitious
scope of the chapter is embodied in article 1701, paragraph 1, which
states: "Each Party shall provide in its territory to the nationals of
another Party adequate and effective protection and enforcement of
intellectual property rights, while ensuring that measures to enforce
intellectual property rights do not themselves become barriers to
legitimate trade."159  Although laudable in theory, achievement of
NAFTA's goals in intellectual property protection and enforcement
depends on reliable administration and dispute resolution among its
parties."6  Without the confidence of its contracting parties, NAFTA
will erode as did GATT. 6'
Article 1702, which establishes NAFTA's provisions as minimum
standards, allows the parties to maintain additional domestic
intellectual property protections. 62 The significant step of creating
156. See supra note 140 (reporting on NAFTA's use of Dunkel Draft). IfNAFTA implements
its provisions more successfully than the GATT implements the Dunkel Draft provisions, it will
represent a strong signal that the United States intends to press on with its agenda, with or
without GATT. As a result, other GATT members would be faced with a strong incentive to
follow the U.S. lead or form other regional trading blocs. See Schott, supra note 80, at 3
(discussing use of bilateral agreements to "goad other countries to move the GATT talks
forward"). But see id. at 50-53 (discussing general limitations of bilateral free trade agreements
in influencing multilateral talks through GATr).
157. SeeNAFTA, supra note 1, at ch. 17 (providing intellectual property provisions regarding
substantive rights, procedural standards, and border practices).
158. See NAFTA, supra note 1, at arts. 1701-04 (setting forth scope, national treatment, and
domestic control provisions for intellectual property).
159. NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 1701.
160. See REPORT OF IFAC-3 ON THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CHAPTER AND OTHER
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY-RELATED ELEMENTS OF THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
4 (1992) [hereinafter IFAC-3] ("NAFTA's actual intellectual property protection can be no
greater than the willingness of the signatories to enforce that protection."); Gadbaw, supra note
75, at 48 (concluding that GATT cannot address trade disputes arising from socioeconomic
differences among members without stronger institutional framework for dispute resolution).
161. SeeAbeam, supra note 71, at 21 (discussing lack of support for GATT following Tokyo
Round's inability to resolve structural differences).
162. NAFrA, supra note 1, at art. 1702 ("A Party may implement in its domestic law more
extensive protection of intellectual property rights than is required under this Agreement,
provided that such protection is not inconsistent with this Agreement"). It is difficult to
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international standards for intellectual property remained unrealized
in GAT until December 1993 because of the lack of consensus
among its many members.163 NAFTA remains similar to GATT,
however, in that any additional domestic protections must not be
inconsistent with the agreement's goal of reducing trade barriers.1"
Undoubtedly, defining what is "not inconsistent" with the agreement
will fuel much debate. Considering the GATT Panel's findings
concerning section 337,65 however, one may assume that nondis-
criminatory treatment among member nations is essential to any
determination of consistency.16
Finally, article 1703, paragraph 1 of NAFTA defines national
treatment standards for nondiscriminatory treatment of contracting
parties. 6 7 Under article 1703, which is similar to GATT's article
XX, parties are expected to protect and enforce intellectual property
rights in a nondiscriminatory manner.16 Paragraph 3 of article
harmonize patent laws in international agreements because of the differing needs and tradition
of individual nations. Glenn E.J. Murphy, Note, The Process Patent Amendments Act of 1988, 9J.L.
& COM. 267, 283 (1989). NAFTA acknowledges this dissonance by permitting the parties to
maintain their individual patent systems, while requiring mutual respect of each party's rights.
SeeNAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 1702-1703. id. at art. 1709, para. 6-7 (allowing parties to maintain
certain patent protections so long as they are not applied prejudicially or discriminatorily against
other parties). This flexibility is particularly important in light of the U.S. "first to invent"
system, which differs from the "first to file" systems of most other countries, including Canada.
Compare The Advisoy Commission on Patent Law Reform; A Report to the Secretary of Commerce 1, 43-55
(1992) (comparing different patent systems and reporting on proposed reforms to U.S. patent
system, such as adoption of first to file system which "provides an overall benefit to U.S.
interests") with Gabriel P. Katona, First-To-File-Not in the United States, 73J. PAT. [& TRADEMARK]
OFF. Soc'y 399, 399-403 (1991) (arguing against adoption of first-to-file system).
163. See Schott, supra note 80, at 7-9 (discussing complexity of GATT negotiations and
difficulty in achieving consensus among member countries). Negotiations among small groups
of 'like-minded" governments allow bilateral and multilateral agreements such as NAFTA to
reach consensus on specifically targeted interests. Id. at 8-9. Thus, NAFTA's intellectual
property provisions can be tailored to meet the needs of its three members. Id. at 9.
164. See supra notes 112-15 (describing section 337's violation of GATT requirement of
consistent national treatment). Generally, NAFTA permits differences in substantive and
procedural domestic law; the differences, however, may not treat parties inconsistently. See
NAFrA, supra note 1, at art. 1703 (requiring national treatment for citizens or entities of other
state parties).
165. See supra note 117 and accompanying text (discussing GATT panel's finding that section
337 violated national treatment requirements of GATT article III).
166. See 35 U.S.C. § 104 (1988) (providing effective filing dates for inventions made abroad
for which inventor seeks U.S. patent); Katona, supra note 162, at 400 (discussing certain U.S.
patent laws that discriminate against foreigners, thus violating national treatment principles).
167. NAFrA, supra note 1, at art. 1703, para. 1 (providing that "[e]ach Party shall accord to
nationals of another Party treatment no less favorable than it accords to its own nationals with
regard to the protection and enforcement of all intellectual property rights").
168. NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 1703, para. 1; see General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, A60-61, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, 262, reprinted in 4 GENERAL AGREEMENT ON
TARIFFS AND TRADE: BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 37-38 (1969) (exempting
from GAIT compliance national measures designed to enforce patents, as long as such measures
"are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail").
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1703, however, permits the contracting parties to avoid the national
treatment provisions of paragraph 1 under certain circumstances, such
as domestic enforcement of intellectual property rights.169 Article
1703 raises questions regarding the potentially discriminatory
application of section 337 exclusion orders against foreign patent
infringers.17° Once amended, however, section 337 will most likely
survive both NAFTA and GATT scrutiny.1
2. Provisions relating to patents
Paragraphs 1 through 4 of article 1709 provide standards for
patentable subject matter.172  Paragraph 1 defines a broad range of
patentable subject matter, including both products and processes,173
conditioned on three basic requirements 74 that parallel U.S. patent
law. 7' Paragraphs 2 and 3 set forth exceptions to the general scope
of paragraph 1. Under paragraph 2, a party may refuse to grant a
patent that would endanger life, health, morality, public order, or the
169. NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 1703, para. 3. Paragraph 3 provides in pertinent part:
A Party may derogate from paragraph 1 in relation to its judicial and administrative
procedures for the protection or enforcement of intellectual property rights . . .
provided that such derogation: (a) is necessary to secure compliance with measures
that are not inconsistent with this Chapter, and (b) is not applied in a manner that
would constitute a disguised restriction on trade.
Id.
By comparison, GATT article XX(d) provides in part that "nothing in this Agreement shall
be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures..
. (d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not consistent with the
provisions of this Agreement, including those relating to . . . protection of patents .... .").
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, A60-61, 55 U.N.T.S. 187,
262, reprinted in 4 GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE: BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND
SELECTED DOCUMENTS 37-38 (1969).
170. See supra note 112 and accompanying text (describing GATT panel's finding that that
section 337 violates of articles m and XX).
171. See NAFrA, supra note 1, at art. 1702 (permitting implementation of more extensive
domestic protection). As for GATr, the interpretation of "implement" will be critical for
procedures such as section 337 to avoid GATT violation. See Clark, supra note 63, at 1177
(discussing how Omnibus Trade Act amendment to section 337 led to GATT violation).
172. See NAFrA, supra note 1, at art. 1709, paras. 1-4 (requiring parties to adopt broad
definition of patentable subject matter with exceptions for specific forms of invention).
173. NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 1709, para. 1.
174. NAFrA, supra note 1, at art. 1709, para. 1. Paragraph 1 provides:
[E]ach Party shall make patents available for any inventions, whether products or
processes, in all fields of technology, provided that such inventions are new, result from
an inventive step and are capable of industrial application. For the purposes of this
Article, a Party may deem the terms "inventive step" and "capable of industrial applica-
tion" to be synonymous with the terms "non-obvious" and "useful," respectively.
Id.
175. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (1988) (listing utility, novelty, and non-obviousness as basic
requirements for patentability under U.S. patent law).
630
1994] PROCESS PATENT PROTECTION UNDER NAFTA
environment."' Similarly, paragraph 3 permits the contracting
parties to exclude inventions and processes affecting life forms. 177
The exceptions listed in paragraph 3 are similar to those found in the
patent laws of some European countries, and they trouble some
commentators who recognize the large capital outlays needed to
develop "higher life forms. 17  Generally, however, process patents
are protected under NAFTA's provisions.
Paragraph 4 standardizes product patent protection for pharmaceu-
tical and agricultural chemicals. 79 This protection is a significant
improvement in the international protection of pharmaceutical and
agrichemical products derived from microbiological processes. 180
This provision ensures that contracting parties either accept these
specific technologies as patentable subject matter or provide ad hoc
product patent protection to inventors for the patent's term. 81
Such protection is particularly important for U.S. process patentees
in the pharmaceutical industry who have suffered tremendous
financial losses from process patent piracy.8 2
Paragraph 5 of article 1709 sets forth rights of exclusivity for both
products and processes. 83  Subparagraph (b) boldly protects
process patentees by granting them the right to exclude others from
176. NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 1709, para. 2 (providing exception to paragraph 1 in
specific areas "not based solely on the ground that the Party prohibits commercial exploitation
in its territory of the subject matter of the patent").
177. NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 1709, para. 3 (providing exception from patentability
requirement of paragraph 1 in cases of (1) various methods of treatment of humans and
animals, (2) plants and animals other than microorganisms, and (3) biological processes other
than microbiological processes).
178. SeeIFAC-3, supranote 160, at 16-17 (noting that"[f]or those North American companies
.. . spending large sums of money in research of transgenic plants, seeds and animals,
[paragraph 3] is very disquieting").
179. NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 1709, para. 4; see IFAC-3, supra note 160, at 17 (describing
provision as "pipeline" protection based on requirement that contracting parties provide first-
time protection on subject matter that is "in the pipeline," that is, already patented elsewhere).
180. See IFAC-3, supra note 160, at 17 (noting that protection of such subject matter is
significant improvement over Dunkel Draft of GATT trade related intellectual property issues).
181. See NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 1709, para. 4 (requiring timetable for introduction of
patentable subject matter directed toward pharmaceutical and agricultural chemicals and
products obtained through microbiological processing intended for food and medicines).
Paragraph 4 of article 1709 will collide with Article 1704's mandatory licensing, which allows
parties to specify in domestic law "licensing practices or conditions that may in particular cases
constitute an abuse of intellectual property rights having an adverse effect on competition in the
relevant market." See NAFMA, supra note 1, at art. 1704.
182. See supra note 98 (describing effects of process patent piracy on U.S. pharmaceutical
industry).
183. NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 1709, para. 5 (providing in part that "where the subject
matter of a patent is a process, the patent shall confer on the patent owner the right to prevent
other persons from using that process ... without the patent owner's consent") (emphasis
added).
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using the patented process.'84 Unlike domestic remedies that
prevent distribution of imported goods" or make importation, use,
or sale of products produced by a patented process an infringe-
ment,186 NAFTA strikes at the true infringer by establishing intema-
tional recognition of process patent rights."8 If NAFTA's adminis-
trative mechanism succeeds in eliminating the actual infringement, it
will have overcome the most difficult procedural problem associated
with foreign piracy: achieving jurisdiction over the citizens of another
sovereign.188  Even assuming that NAFTA's procedural system is
capable of eliminating the actual foreign process infringement, the
question still remains as to whether the system could respond before
critical U.S. industries became irreparably damaged or lost.8 9
In paragraph 11 of Article 1709, a presumption of process
infringement shifts the burden of proof to a defendant in an
infringement proceeding.' Similar to the presumption of §
271(g),"' a defendant must show that "the allegedly infringing
product was made by a process other than the patented process."192
As a domestic law, however, § 271 (g) does not provide personal
jurisdiction over a foreign national.'93 Moreover, the foreign
infringer may simply rebut the presumption, thus making discovery
impossible. To compensate for these shortcomings, the parties have
agreed to minimum standards of intellectual property protection.
94
Thus, while no sovereign party actually submits to the jurisdiction of
another, each party consents to provide the domestic procedures
184. NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 1709, para. 5(b).
185. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d) (1988) (excluding foreign-made articles that violate U.S. patent
law from U.S. market).
186. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (1988).
187. NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 1709, para. 5 (conferring on patent owners right to
preclude use, sale, or importation of product obtained by patented process).
188. See supra notes 136-56 and accompanying text (describing need for international
cooperation to permit discovery between nations with different civil procedures before true
determination of infringement is possible).
189. See supra notes 35-48 and accompanying text (describing detrimental effect of process
piracy on U.S. high-technology industries).
190. NAMTA, supra note 1, at art. 1709, para. 11 (providing for rebuttal of presumption of
infringement by defendant's showing that "(a) the product obtained by the process is new;, or
(b) a substantial likelihood exists that the allegedly infringing product was made by the process
and the patent owner has been unable through reasonable efforts to determine the process
actually used").
191. See supra note 11 land accompanying text (detailing criteria for presumption of foreign
process infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 295).
192. NATA, supra note 1, at art. 1709, para. 11.
193. See supranote 111 and accompanying text (describingjurisdictional deficiencies among
sovereign nations and their impact on enforcement of § 271 (g)).
194. See HUFBAUER & SCHOTrr, supra note 136, at 146-47.
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necessary to protect the agreed-upon rights of all other parties.' 9
Further, unlike § 271(g), NAFTA contains the additional limitation
that "[i]n the gathering and evaluation of evidence, the legitimate
interests of the defendant in protecting its trade secrets shall be taken
into account."196 This provision seeks to prevent abuse of the
discovery procedures in order to learn a competitor's trade se-
crets. 97 For example, a U.S. manufacturer that owns a process
patent could not file an infringement suit against a foreign manufac-
turer and use the presumptive burden shift to force the foreign
manufacturer to disclose its trade secrets to prove that the manufac-
turer did not use the patented process.
3. Provisions relating to enforcement of rights
GATr demonstrates that an agreement's credibility ultimately rests
on its ability to resolve disputes.'98 The success of NAFTA's intellec-
tual property provisions and their impact on future GATT negotia-
tions thus turn on enforcement.'" NAFIA's enforcement proce-
dures for intellectual property are found in Articles 1714-1719. Article
1714 is the general enforcement provision, requiring "expeditious
remedies" to prevent and deter infringements and incorporating the
consistent application rule set forth in Article 1701, paragraph 1.2
Paragraphs 2 through 4 of Article 1714 address questions of fairness
and due process, such as reasonable procedural time limits in an
enforcement proceeding, requirements that administrative agencies
195. See PAUL REUTER, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF TREATiEs 3 (1989) (discussing "basic
principles" of international treaties and explaining that "only final consent is legally binding, but
agreed formalities may act as milestones marking the procedural stages leading up to final
consent"); see also NEALE & STEPHENS, supra note 23, at 11 (identifying consent as principal pillar
of international law).
196. NAFrA, supra note 1, at art. 1709, para. 11.
197. SeeNAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 1711, para. 1 (a) (defining "trade secret" as "information
* secret in the sense that it is not, as a body or in the precise configuration and assembly of
its components, generally known among or readily accessible to persons that normally deal with
the kind of information in question").
198. See Gadbaw, supra note 75, at 42-45 (reviewing evolution of GATI"s dispute resolution
mechanisms and concluding that effectiveness of enforcement is linked to "willingness of the
offending country to comply with GATr rules").
199. See HUFBAUER & SCHOTT, supra note 136, at 90.
200. NAFrA, supra note 1, at art. 1714, para. 1. Paragraph 1 of article 1714 provides:
Each Party shall ensure that enforcement procedures, as specified in this Article and
Articles 1715 through 1718, are available under its domestic law so as to permit
effective action to be taken against any act of infringement of intellectual property
rights covered by this Chapter, including expeditious remedies to prevent infringe-
ments and remedies to deter further infringements. Such enforcement procedures
shall be applied so as to avoid the creation of barriers to legitimate trade and to
provide for safeguards against abuse of the procedures.
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issue their decisions in writing, and opportunity for appeal. 01
These procedural provisions represent an ambitious standard for
international cooperation, and, if effective, will provide a benchmark
for future GATT negotiations. 2
Article 1715 sets forth specific procedures for the enforcement of
rights.20 3  Of particular interest is paragraph 2, which sets forth
discovery standards.0 4 By setting standards that enable the parties
to use their own civil discovery procedures, NAIFTA may provide
enough sovereign control to prevent abuses.05  Paragraph 7,
however, is problematic, especially in cases of process patent
infringement. By limiting liability in infringement actions to an
"adequate remuneration," 20 6 which prevents recovery of punitive
damages, paragraph 7 eviscerates the incentive to avoid infringe-
ment.20 7  Unlike punitive damages, compensatory damages do not
201. See NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 1714, paras. 2-4 (requiring fair and equitable
procedures, avoidance of unnecessary delays, and adherence to due process considerations such
as written decisions, opportunity to be heard, evidentiary considerations, and opportunity for
judicial review of decisions).
202. See HUFBAUER & SCHOTT, supra note 136, at 90 ("In the intellectual property area,
NAFrA stands as a model ... for resolving outstanding disputes .... [T]he accomplishments
in NAFrA are so striking that it has quickly become the preferred benchmark for evaluating the
accomplishments of GATT and other trade agreements."); cf Trade and Technology Hearings, supra
note 38, at 24-25 (statement of Charles 0. Verrill, Jr., Partner, Wiley, Rein & Fielding, Adjunct
Professor of International Trade Law and Regulation, Georgetown University Law Center)
(portraying rules of origin in Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement as benchmark for
rules of origin in Uruguay Round negotiations).
203. See NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 1715, para. 1 ("Each Party shall make available to right
holders civil judicial procedures for the enforcement of any intellectual property right covered
by this Chapter.").
204. NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 1715, para. 2(a). Paragraph 2(a) of article 1715 provides:
Each Party shall provide that its judicial authorities shall have the authority. (a) where
a party in a proceeding has presented reasonably available evidence sufficient to
support its claims and has specified evidence relevant to the substantiation of its claims
that is within the control of the opposing party, to order the opposing party to produce
such evidence, subject in appropriate cases to conditions that ensure the protection of
confidential information.
Id.
205. Essentially, the NAFTA system requires a good-laith effort on the part of each party's
judiciary to uphold NAFTA's standards. Absent personal jurisdiction over the alleged infringer,
the U.S. process patent holder has no right to discover a foreign process. By signing NAFIA,
however, each party promises to use its domestic civil procedure pursuant to the agreement.
The effectiveness of process protection depends on each party's adherence to and faith in the
system. See HUFBA ER & SCHoTr, supra note 136, at 90 (noting that NAFTA's enforcement
responsibilities fall on member nations).
206. NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 1715, para. 7 (stating that in infringement action, sued
party may limit its liability to "adequate remuneration in the circumstances of each case, taking
into account the economic value of the use").
207. See 134 CONG. REC. H2291 (1988) (statement of Rep. Hyde) ("The strength of
incentives for invention.., provided by U.S. patent rights depends upon providing rights to the
patent owner to exclude competitors from practicing the invention. A right merely to receive
a royalty from others who practice the patented invention is a much weaker incentive for future
research and development."); Haymond, supra note 108, at 570-71 (discussing limitation of
634
1994] PROCESS PATENT PROTECrION UNDER NAFTA 635
provide infringers with adequate disincentive to avoid the infringe-
ment.2 8  For process patents in critical technologies, such weak
patent protection does little to advance the United States' competitive
position.
Articles 1716 and 1717 establish standards forjudicial authority and
criminal penalties. Article 1716 sets forth measures designed to
empower judicial authorities and to prevent abuses.2° Specifically,
each party must provide a mechanism for bringing complaints, 210
determining the complaints' merits,211 and stopping the infringe-
ment.212 Additionally, article 1717 requires each party to provide
criminal procedures and penalties for wilful infringements.21 3
Article 1718 concerns enforcement of rights at the border.214
Unlike section 337, which now contains a presumption of infringe-
ment following the Omnibus Trade Act, 215 NAFTA contains no
presumption at the border.1 6 Paragraph 2 of article 1718 is particu-
larly burdensome for process patent owners who cannot determine
process infringement from merely inspecting the imported prod-
uct.21 7 Paragraph 10 may solve this problem by detaining goods in
suspect cases until evidence of infringement may be obtained.218
Unfortunately, the problems associated with proving infringement do
damages provision found in early drafts of 35 U.S.C. § 2 7 1 (g) and its subsequent elimination
because of failure to provide strong enough incentives to avoid infringement).
208. Cf Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Historical Continuity of Punitive Damages
Awards: Reforming the Tort Reformers, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1269, 1318-20 (1993) (describing
punishment and deterrence functions of punitive damages).
209. NAFI'A, supra note 1, at art. 1716.
210. See NAFrA, supra note 1, at art. 1716, para. 1 (requiring that each party provide judicial
authorities to prevent infringement of intellectual property rights).
211. See NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 1716, par. 2 (stipulating that each party empower
judicial authorities to summon, preserve, and consider relevant evidence and information).
212. See NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 1716, para. 1 (providing that each party empower
judicial authorities to prevent entry of violative goods into jurisdiction's commerce channels).
213. NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 1717, paras. 1, 3.
214. SeeNAFTA, supranote 1, at art. 1718, para. 1 (directing parties to adopt procedures that
enable right holders who suspect importation of violative goods to petition authorities to
suspend release of goods by customs administration).
215. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107
(1988) (codified at scattered sections of U.S.C.).
216. See NAFIA, supra note 1, at art. 1718 (failing to place burden on alleged infringer to
enforce intellectual property rights at border).
217. See NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 1718, para. 2. Paragraph 2 of article 1718 provides:
Each Party shall require any applicant who initiates procedures under paragraph 1 to
provide adequate evidence: (a) to satisfy that Party's competent authorities that, under
the domestic laws of the country of importation, there is prima fade an infringement
of its intellectual property right; and (b) to supply a sufficiently detailed description
of the goods to make them readily recognizable by the customs administration.
Id. In cases of process infringement, there may be no way to adhere to either provision without
adequate time to analyze the product. Even then, proof of infringement may not be prima
facie. See supra notes 18-34 (discussing problems of proof with process infringement).
218. NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 1718, para. 10.
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not necessarily dissolve with detention time.
Finally, article 1719 provides for cooperation and technical
assistance among the parties.1 9 The purpose of article 1719 is to
eliminate trade in goods that infringe intellectual property rights.2
By fostering communication among the contracting parties, NAFTA
can perhaps avoid the stalemates that have frequently plagued
GATT.221 Without such cooperation, NAFTA will certainly follow
GATT's path to reduced effectiveness.
III. PROCESS PATENT PROTECTION BEYOND NAFTA
NAFTA's high degree of international cooperation is essential in
resolving the longstanding problems of jurisdiction, discovery, and
proof in foreign process infringement proceedings. 222  While the
United States, Canada, and Mexico represent an impressive sphere of
economic influence, a broad-based multilateral system remains
necessary for intellectual property rights worldwide.23 GATT's
adoption of the Dunkel text 24 signifies substantial progress for
process patent owners through that agreement's broad multilateral
protection.225  Unfortunately, GATT's intellectual property provi-
sions are not as ambitious as those in NAFTA.226  Additionally, as
GATT has historically demonstrated, its ability to resolve disputes
219. NAFMA, supra note 1, at art. 1719, par. 1 ("The Parties shall provide each other on
mutually agreed terms with technical assistance and shall promote cooperation between their
competent authorities. Such cooperation shall include, but not be limited to, the training of
personnel.").
220. NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 1719, para. 2 ("The Parties shall cooperate with a view to
eliminating trade in goods that infringe intellectual property rights. For this purpose, each Party
shall establish and notify the other Parties of contact points in its federal government and shall
exchange information concerning trade in infringing goods.").
221. See generally Gadbaw, supra note 75, at 37-45 (reviewing institutional problems that have
plagued GATF).
222. See HUFBAUER & SCHOTr, supra note 136, at 90 (concluding that value of NAFMA in
arena of intellectual property rights is contingent on enforcement, which, in turn, is contingent
on practices of member countries).
223. See World Economy Hearings, supra note 100, at 4 (statement ofJames D. Robinson II,
Chairman & CEO, American Express, Chairman, Business Roundtable Task Force on
International Trade and Investment) ("[I]f the total pie is to grow, we must have a multilateral
framework, even if it is imperfect.... A world without GATiT would be worse than New York
City without traffic lights.").
224. See supra note 133 (detailing Dunkel text adoption by GATT negotiators).
225. Cf Trade and Technology Hearings, supra note 38, at 91-93 (statement of Gerald J.
Mossinghoff, President, Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association) (discussing profundity of
problem imposed on pharmaceutical industry due to dearth of international intellectual
property protection and expressing industry's endorsement of efforts to achieve such protection
through Uruguay Round and NAFTA).
226. See supra note 133 and accompanying text (discussing adoption of Dunkel text).
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among members is questionable.227  If NAFTA proves successful in
protecting intellectual property rights, it may continue to influence
future GATT negotiations."8 For GATT to continue its intellectual
property reforms, however, NAFTA's contracting parties must
demonstrate their commitment and leadership through timely and
efficient administrative and dispute resolution systems.22 9
A primary impediment to continued commitment to such trade
agreements is national interest.2 As GATT has historically demon-
strated, the delicate balance between liberalized trade and national
interest often turns on the parties' confidence in the agreement. 31
Without an administrative system capable of responding efficiently to
political and economic fluctuations that affect the contracting parties,
the costs of such trade agreements overshadow their perceived
benefits. 2 2 Thus, a major difficulty in establishing a reliable trade
mechanism among nations centers on the need to define national
interests and to agree on adequate standards and procedures for their
protection. 2 3 Further, with contractual agreements such as NAFTA
or GATT, the true challenge for the parties is coordinating and
prioritizing these national interests prior to, and in anticipation of,
the actual negotiation process.23
Unfortunately, criticism of uncoordinated U.S. trade policy has
227. See supra notes 81-90 and accompanying text (discussing GATr's ineffectiveness at
resolving disputes following Tokyo Round).
228. See NAFTA, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 51, at 2178 (Dec. 23, 1992) (quoting
Commerce Department spokesperson as saying "NAFTA's provisions are superior to those being
negotiated in the Uruguay Round .... The most obvious example is NAFTA's provisions on
intellectual property rights... [which are] viewed as a model for other agreements around the
world"); Alan J. Stoga, A Strategy Laced with Contradictions, LA. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1993, at B7
(stating that next round of GATT talks may come sooner than most politicians would like
because of largely unfinished issues such as intellectual property).
229. See supra note 163 and accompanying text (asserting that need for strong administrative
functions in NAFTA is prerequisite for its acceptance as successful protection mechanism for
intellectual property rights).
230. See Schott, supra note 80, at 9 (stating that main objective of U.S. trade policy in recent
years has been managing political fallout and deflecting protectionist pressures in order to
sustain support for free trade); see also O'Reilly, supra note 3, at 68 (discussing need to avoid
.protectionist impulses" which increase during economic downturns and supporting GATT and
NAFTA goals of maintaining open markets and increasing exports).
231. See Gadbaw, supra note 75, at 37 (stating that "[iut seems natural that parties to GATT
consider once again the nature of their bargain and seek to restore the political goodwill that
appears to be threatened by domestic economic difficulties").
232. See Gadbaw, supra note 75, at 38 (noting that parties' adherence to GAIT rules is
function of perceived effectiveness of GATr system in enforcing rules against others).
233. See Schott, supra note 80, at 7 (noting protection and harmonization of national
interests to be among obstacles confronting GAT).
234. See Schott, supra note 80, at 9 (describing U.S. interest in 1980s of reducing trade deficit
and consequential U.S. actions in international arena).
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existed at least since the Tokyo Round.3 5 Although the United
States called for negotiations on high-technology trade as early as
1982,236 poor policy definition and lack of coordination prevented
such talks from proceeding.23 7  As a result, foreign governments
operating under more coordinated government-industry struc-
tures238  eroded the U.S. industrial base.2 39  The United States'
refusal to coordinate domestic technology policy following the Tokyo
Round, 4° and the resultant lack of bargaining strength during the
early 1980s,24 t led to inadequate protection for some U.S. high-
technology industries.4 This erosion of U.S. high technology
through poor policy coordination is exemplified by piracy of process
235. See Graham, supra note 75, at 16 ("Incoherence is largely the result of a trade policy-
making apparatus that remains from the days when the United States could take its commercial
competitiveness at home and abroad for granted.").
236. See Graham, supra note 75, at 11-13 (reviewing Reagan administration's ardent effort to
implement 1982 GATI Ministerial and listing high-technology trade among U.S. trade priorities
for negotiation at Ministerial).
237. See Graham, supra note 75, at 13 (indicating that Reagan administration hastily called
for Ministerial without regard for contingencies such as prospects of success for trade priorities).
238. See Technology Policy and Competitiveness: The Government's Role: HearingBefore the Subcomm.
on Government Information and Regulation of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 102d Cong.,
2dSess. 1 (1992) [hereinafter Technology Policy Hearings] (statement of Sen. Kohl) ("Injapan and
Germany, government and industry work together to formulate technology policy. In the
United States, government and industry do not work closely together."); id. at 11 (statement of
Julie F. Gorte, Senior Associate, Office of Technology Assessment) (identifying two European
examples of technology policy and noting that "every time we look across an ocean or across a
border, we see a country whose Government is striving to be a partner with the private sector
in technology and development [while the United States is] probably at the bottom of the list.").
239. SeeAhearn, supra note 71, at 22 (discussing foreign practices promoting high-technology
industries such as computers, fiber optics, aerospace, and telecommunications, and U.S. refusal
to adopt such practices despite recognition of long-term global importance of such technolo-
gies); see also TYSON, supra note 47, at 4 (describing various nontraditional forms of governmen-
tal support for high-technology industry including "competition policies, R&D policies,
intellectual property protection, standards and testing procedures"); Harvey Brooks, Technology
as a Factor in U.S. Competitiveness, in U.S. COMPETITIVENESS IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 328, 331
(Bruce R. Scott & George C. Lodge eds., 1985) ("Except in the field of specific defense
technologies, decisions about protecting domestic markets from foreign competition are not
made as part of a technology-promotion strategy as they are in Japan and in an increasing
number of European countries (most notably France)."); Hobart Rowan, A Dangerous Slide
Toward Protectionism, WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 1993, at HI (discussing Japanese acknowledgement
of gaiatsu, or external pressure, required in persuadingJapan to open its markets to foreigners).
240. See Technology Policy Hearings, supra note 238, at 7 (testimony of Erich Bloch,
Distinguished Fellow, Council on Competitiveness) (emphasizing lack of U.S. technology policy
over last four decades).
241. See Technology Policy Hearings, supra note 238, at 4 (testimony ofJulie F. Gorte, Senior
Associate, Office of Technology Assessment) (emphasizing loss of U.S. share of world exports,
gain of U.S. share of imports, drop in real U.S. wages, reduction in U.S. standard of living, and
ultimate erosion of U.S. competitiveness).
242. See Critical Technologies Hearings, supra note 48, at 3 (statement of Rep. Horn) ("Our
nation is facing unprecedented competition from abroad in all areas of critical technologies.
[The governments of Japan and Germany] plan to work hand-in-hand with their businesses
toward their goals of being first in the world in those technologies. We have seen what their
approach to government/private sector cooperation has brought them.").
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patents on pharmaceuticals during the 1980s.243
In order to establish adequate standards for process patent
protection through future international trade agreements, whether
bilateral or multilateral, the United States must improve its coordina-
tion and prioritization of the assorted procedures and policies that
affect high-technology trade.2 4 As section 337 and § 271 (g) illus-
trate, domestic law and policy often run afoul of an international
trade agreement's free-trade spirit.245 Improved coordination of
domestic and international policies will better define and protect
national interests during international trade negotiations, 246 prevent
erosion of critical domestic high-technology industry,247 and aid in
streamlining domestic efforts.24  As a result, the United States may
regain its competitive advantage in critical high-technology industries.
Thus, to protect its process-based technology interests, the United
States must establish an improved mechanism for defining and
coordinating its domestic and international high-technology trade
issues.2
49
Historically, the United States has been reluctant to engage in
government planning of economic matters or to establish a technolo-
gy policy." ° "Technology policy," a term cautiously avoided in the
243. See Trade and Technology Hearngs, supra note 38, at 69 (testimony of Gerald J.
Mossinghoff, President, Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association) (emphasizing that
pharmaceutical industry loses $5 billion annually to foreign patent pirates, based on estimates
by International Trade Commission and United States Trade Representatives).
244. See TiSON, supra note 47, at 286 (noting need for both trade and domestic technology
policy in revitalizing U.S. technological edge); see also Trade and Technology Hearings, supra note
38, at 122 (statement of David C. Mowery, Associate Professor, HAAS School of Business,
University of California, Berkeley) (discussing need for strong coordinating body for technology
policy to organize numerous government agencies with different agendas).
245. Seesupranotes 109, 111-12 and accompanying text (discussing perception of section 337
and § 27 1 (g) as contrary to GATT's national treatment requirements).
246. See Graham, supra note 75, at 15-16 (recommending U.S. clarification of international
trade interests and priorities following Tokyo Round).
247. See Graham, supra note 75, at 16 (stating that "[o]nly by consolidating dispersed
functions under one strong head can U.S. policy begin to take on the unity and precision that
is needed to address effectively the decline of basic industries [and] the competitive impact of
industrial policies").
248. See Graham, supra note 75, at 16 (discussing possibility of Cabinet-level department
focusing on U.S. competitiveness issues).
249. See TYSON, supra note 47, at 9-14 (outlining "cautious activist" approach toward
protection of high-technology industry).
250. See Graham, supra note 75, at 8 (discussing United States' avoidance of centralized
economic planning and its tendency to "impos[e] a restriction here and negotiat[e] a deal
there"); see also Technology Polity Hearings, supra note 238, at 12 (statement of Loren C. Schmid,
Chairman, Federal Laboratory Consortium for Technology Transfer) (noting sentiment pervasive
in 1960s and 1970s that "[g]overnment stays over here and industry stays over there, and you
do not get together"); TYSON, supra note 47, at 2 (recognizing that "traditional approaches to
trade and domestic policy that served the nation so well when American companies had an
unrivaled technological lead are no longer adequate"); Brooks, supra note 239, at 331
(discussing U.S. technology policy as use of "protectionist instruments ... largely as a case-by-
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:603
United States, has existed for years, hovever, under less formal names
or centralized structures. 1 Given the importance of process-based
technology, and its expanding role in global trade and international
competitive positioning, 2 a technology policy is now a necessi-
ty.253
This Comment recommends a dual-role technology policy. First,
the United States must define a consistent and detailed policy to
improve its leadership in high-technology trade negotiations.2 4
Second, by improving coordination among government, academia,
and industry, the United States can streamline its commercialization
of high technology by increasing productivity, eliminating duplicative
efforts, and improving communication.255  As the following recom-
mendations illustrate, these two roles are closely related.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
The United States should establish a coordinating group for
process-based technology within a broader federal technology or
industrial policy mechanism. 6 Because so many critical technolo-
case response to domestic political pressures rather than as part of a coherent strategy for
gestating or nurturing future competitive industries").
251. See Trade and Technology Hearings, supra note 38, at 123 (testimony of David C. Mowery,
Associate Professor, HAAS School of Business, University of California, Berkeley) (describing
implicit technology policies pursued by United States through Department of Defense, National
Institute of Health, and the National Aeronautic and Space Administration); see also Technology
Policy Hearings, supra note 238, at 92 (statement of Julie F. Gorte, Senior Associate, Office of
Technology Assessment) (noting government policies that supported "technology development
and diffusion" in civil aeronautics and agriculture); Brooks, supra note 239, at 332-33 (describing
U.S. industrial policy during Cold War as centering around defense technologies).
252. See Technology Policy Hearings, supra note 238, at 24 (testimony of Marc Newkirk,
President and CEO, Lanxide Corporation) (asserting that process technologies developed by
Lanxide foster performance advantages in several products and processes which compose basic
underpinnings of U.S. economy, ultimately yielding U.S. advantage).
253. See TYSON, supra note 47, at 289 ("In the aftermath of the Cold War, the challenge is
to find ways of reconfiguring the institutions and incentives of the nation's military industrial
policy to match the new realities of international competition."); see also Technology Policy
Hearings, supra note 238, at 15-16 (testimony of Erich Bloch, Distinguished Fellow, Council on
Competitiveness) (emphasizing that "U.S. competitiveness depends on a consistent long-term
technology policy"); Graham, supra note 75, at 9 (identifying Japanese and European
governments as willing to competitively promote high-technology industries).
254. See O'Reilly, supra note 3, at 72 (recommending development of 'a coherent
government policy for promoting exports").
255. See TYSON, supra note 47, at 286-96 (discussing need for complementary technology and
industrial policies).
256. See, e.g., Technology Policy Hearings, supranote 238, at 17 (statement of Sen. Roth) (noting
proposed "National Economic Council" that would provide governmental guidance in enhancing
U.S. competitiveness); TYSON, supra note 47, at 289 (discussing development of "institutional
mechanism for assessing competitive and technological trends in global high-technology
industries"); Christopher Farrell et aL, Industrial Policy, Bus. WL, Apr. 6, 1992, at 70 (positing
that United States needs industrial policy to remain competitive). But see Technology Policy
Hearings, supra note 238, at 17 (statement of Erich Bloch, Distinguished Fellow, Council on
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gies are process based, such a coordinating group should target high-
technology industries." 7 The agency should implement two primary
goals: (1) the monitoring, evaluation, and promotion of U.S. process-
based technology industries internationally; and (2) the efficient
coordination of national resources to maintain U.S. competitiveness
in such technologies.
Monitoring and evaluating international developments serves a
number of purposes. Initially, it would prevent the agency from
relying solely on information from special interests, thus avoiding the
promotion of process-based technologies backed only by influential
lobbyists.2 8 Further, such a function would aid in defining national
interests and policies, a necessary step in preparing for international
trade negotiations on process patent rights. 9 In determining
national interest, a coordinating agency should evaluate various
process-based technologies and consider market demands, process
feasibilities, and potential for multiple commercial applications.2 1
Rather than select technological winners and losers, as critics of
technology policy fear, the agency should define consistent and
detailed requirements for the promotion of process-based, high-
technology industries in both the international and domestic law
contexts.261
Competitiveness) (evincing disapproval for proposed council for fear of "[a]dding to the
bureaucracy").
257. See Critical Technologies Hearings, supra note 48, at 6 (statement of Dr. William D. Phillips,
Chairman of the National Critical Technologies Panel) (describing Federal Coordinating
Council for Science, Engineering, and Technology (FCCSET) as "a powerful mechanism for
coordinating and rationalizing technology programs across agencies of the federal govern-
ment"); see also O'Reilly, supra note 3, at 72 (reporting formation of trade policy coordinating
committee in 1990, headed by Secretary of Commerce, which lacked authority over budgets and
programs of government agencies).
258. See TYSON, supra note 47, at 289-90 (describing series of U.S. trade policy initiatives
instituted during 1980s based on influential U.S. corporations, whose information and analyses
served as principal resources for "understaffed and underfunded" U.S. government officials
operating without coordinated policy); see also Technology Polity Hearings, supra note 238, at 18
(statement of Julie F. Gorte, Senior Associate, Office of Technology Assessment) (noting
likelihood of special or regional interests co-opting any government program that supported
industrial effectiveness).
259. See TYSON, supra note 47, at 289 (stating that coordinated technology agency could
provide 'industry-specific information required to make wise decisions on a variety of trade
policy questions").
260. See TYSON, supra note 47, at 289 (describing tasks tailored to such agency including
.evaluating the likely course of key American industries; comparing these baseline projections
with visions of industry paths ... and monitoring the activities of foreign governments and
firms"); see also Materials Hearings, supra note 39, at 85-86 (supporting creation of regulatory
agency that promotes movement of capital-intensive, high-technology materials from laboratory
to defense applications through government funding and incentives).
261. See TYSON, supra note 47, at 290 (recommending numerous agencies capable of
coordinating tasks); see also Graham, supra note 75, at 16 (discussing need for U.S. Department
of Trade and Industry to coordinate functions presently administered by Commerce
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Based on such technology evaluations, the agency could achieve the
second goal of improved coordination and allocation of national
resources.2 6 2  Federal laboratories 263 and U.S. academic institu-
tions264 represent the best opportunity to coordinate efforts in
matters of basic research. 5  Industry could then provide the
window to the commercial world and help determine market
applications for innovative process-based technologies.2  Further-
more, a coordinated policy should include an incentive system which
would reduce duplicative efforts among and within groups, control
funding, and foster cooperation regarding equipment and exper-
tise.2 7 For example, financial incentives for startup manufacturing
could be established.2 11 Companies abandon many process-based
technologies because of their capital-intensive nature and perceived
low returns. 9 Conversely, large companies often own large num-
bers of exploitable inventions, but choose other, higher profit
Department, International Trade Commission, U.S. Trade Representative, and State Department
to prevent ad hoc reactions of dispersed policymaking system).
262. See Critical Technologies Hearings, supra note 51, at 32 (statement of Jon B. DeVault,
President, Composite Products Group, Hercules Advanced Materials and Systems Co.)
(recommending "emphasis on market pull-through, defined by key industry/government teams,
versus a traditional technology push through [of] national laboratories").
263. See Lee Smith, What the U.S. Can Do About R&D, FORTiNE, Oct. 19, 1992, at 76
(discussing human resources of federal laboratories including 100,000 researchers representing
20% of engineering and science doctorates in United States); see also Technology Policy Hearings,
supra note 238, at 21 (testimony ofJack Simon, Manager, Government R&D Programs, General
Motors) (emphasizing significant role of federal laboratories by describing such labs as "crown
jewels of American technology").
264. Smith, supra note 263, at 75-76 (comparing American research universities to European
andJapanese counterparts which "lack the diversity and creative tumult of American campuses").
265. Smith, supra note 263, at 76 (suggesting gradual elimination of redundant and
substandard federal labs and "[p ] utting the genius of the great labs at the disposal of business");
see also Technology Policy Hearings, supra note 238, at 8 (statement of Erich Bloch, Distinguished
Fellow, Council on Competitiveness) (emphasizing inadequacy of participation of industry in
government technology programs); TYSON, supra note 47, at 290 (recommending shift of federal
R&D spending from military focus to civilian or "dual use" focus in basic research).
266. See Smith, supra note 263, at 75 (discussing industrial R&D focus toward "down-to-earth
matters" and improving existing systems); see also Technology Policy Hearings, supra note 238, at 8
(statement of Sen. Kohl) ("It is through R&D and the commercialization of technology that new
markets and new jobs are made.").
267. See Smith, supra note 263, at 76 (discussing cooperation between Argonne lab, which
is building $800 million X-ray source, and various industrial sponsors that are paying from $5
to $15 million for access rights); see also TYSON, supra note 47, at 290 (listing recommendations
to develop foresighted coordinated policy to support high-technology industries).
268. See Trade and Technology Hearings, supra note 38, at 116 (discussing problems domestic
firms face in obtaining start-up capital); see also Brooks, supra note 239, at 356 (recognizing
inability to exploit U.S. innovations until capital for market expansion becomes less cost
prohibitive).
269. See TYSON, supra note 47, at 286 (discussing advanced display technology invented in
United States but dominated in commercial markets by Japanese companies due to high cost
and "limited patience" of capital providers).
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technologies based on corporate size. 270 Regional high-technology
centers provide an ideal environment to bring these underutilized
innovations out of the laboratory and into the commercial market-
place.2 ' Here, the opportunity exists to coordinate government
funding and pure science research, academic applied science
research, and industry funding and manufacturing expertise to
incubate new high-technology industries based on innovative
processing272 while fostering technically skilled employment and
training in these jobs of the future.273
The second goal focuses on improving product development to
prevent U.S. high-technology industries from discounting competitive
technology.2 * A critical weakness in U.S. competitiveness centers
on the inability of the United States to apply its own innovation to
useful commercial products.275  As has been discussed throughout
this Comment, domestic process patents are particularly susceptible
270. SeeSmith, supra note 263, at75 (reporting on General Electric's Schenectady, NewYork
laboratory, where scientists must have financial support of G.E. operations business before
conducting particular research).
271. See Trade and Technology Hearings, supra note 38, at 116 (discussing regional concentra-
tions of U.S. high-technology industry, including Research Triangle in North Carolina, Silicon
Valley in California, and Route 128 outside Boston). Other such concentrations are forming.
For example, Coming Glass and Alfred University have recently initiated the Ceramics Corridor
Program whereby plant space, tax incentives, licensing, and other services are provided to
entrepreneurs for a fixed period of time to "incubate" high technology ceramics companies.
See Kevin Kelly et al., Hot Spots, Bus. WK., Oct. 19, 1992, at 80, 84-86 (assessing various U.S.
regions experiencing high growth resulting from cooperation among academia, business, and
government).
272. See Critical Technologies Hearings, supra note 48, at 46-47 (statement of Dr. John Kardos,
Chairman, Department of Chemical Engineering, Washington University) (outlining five-point
policy regarding consortia that would: (1) require government involvement when industry alone
lacks adequate resources to remain competitive; (2) focus consortia on commercially realizable
goals with low risk; (3) provide funding based on merit as determined by appropriate review by
'people who are experts in the area of focus;" (4) improve transfer and commercialization of
technology; and (5) involve government, industry and academia).
273. See Technical Education, Wo* Force Training, and U.S. Competitiveness, Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Technology and Competitiveness of the House Comm. on Science, Space, and Technology,
102d Cong., 1st Sess. 16-17 (1991) (statement of Rep. Price) (discussing National Science
Foundation (NSF) program for training and education in advanced technologies and need to
expand NSF-sponsored research at two- and four-year academic institutions). In North
Carolina's Research Triangle, businesses have already reported a lack of skilled workers and
unfilled positions. Id. at 17.
274. See Smith, supra note 263, at 75 (discussing industrial shifting of R&D funding away
from basic research toward development of "better, more competitive products").
275. See Trade and Technology Hearings, supra note 43, at 130 (discussing poor U.S.
performance in "rapid and effective adoption of existing technologies"); see also Technology Policy
Hearings, supra note 238, at 7 (testimony of Erich Bloch, Distinguished Fellow, Council on
Competitiveness) (emphasizing tremendous success of 40-year U.S. science policy despite
absence of companion technology policy to realize applications); id. at 13 (statement of Loren
C. Schmid, Chairman, Federal Lab Consortium for Technology Transfer) (noting numerous
instances of foreign governments' capitalization on U.S. laboratories' achievements once U.S.
industry has displayed disinterest in them).
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to foreign exploitation. 76 By coordinating technology policy, the
United States could create a system of basic research and product
development where government and industry could respond
simultaneously to commercial needs and developments. 217  By
moving innovation out of the laboratory and into the stream of
commerce, both the individual's incentive to invent and the nation's
competitive position would flourish.
CONCLUSION
In many ways, process patents represent our country's future. This
form of intellectual property signifies one of our national strengths:
innovation at the cutting edge of technology. Process patents also
illustrate a national weakness: an inability to protect a national
strength. Process patents present this nation with the challenge of
renewing U.S. competitiveness based on the increased importance of
high-technology trade.
While the domestic and international intellectual property
protections available today may help the United States to regain its
competitive edge, the lessons of the past decade must not escape
scrutiny. The United States must continue to lead efforts to improve
protection of intellectual property. The United States must also
create an internal structure for the efficient coordination of U.S.
technology as a national resource. The United States must act quickly
and from a position of coherence and strength: as process patents
have illustrated, the competition never sleeps.
276. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text (describing nature and consequences of
foreign piracy problem); see also supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text (providing
hypothetical illustration of foreign pirate exploiting protected domestic process technology);
supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text (emphasizing consequences of piracy).
277. See Smith, supra note 263, at 74-75 (discussing formation of civilian agency able to
"invest in businesses willing to develop technologies where the U.S. lags behind").
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